Congressional Record: September 20, 2002 (Senate)
Page S8987-S8998

SOURCE: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_cr/s092002.html
(Copied and Pasted in case the information disappears) (39 Pages Long)

                          HOW SADDAM HAPPENED

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, yesterday, at a hearing of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, I asked a question of the Secretary of Defense. I
referred to a Newsweek article that will appear in the September 23,
2002, edition. That article reads as follows. It is not overly lengthy.
I shall read it. Beginning on page 35 of Newsweek, here is what the
article says:

       America helped make a monster. What to do with him--and
     what happens after he is gone--has haunted us for a quarter
     century.

  The article is written by Christopher Dickey and Evan Thomas. It
reads as follows:

       The last time Donald Rumsfeld saw Saddam Hussein, he gave
     him a cordial handshake. The date was almost 20 years ago,
     Dec. 20, 1983; an official Iraqi television crew recorded the
     historic moment.
       The once and future Defense secretary, at the time a
     private citizen, had been sent by President Ronald Reagan to
     Baghdad as a special envoy. Saddam Hussein, armed with a
     pistol on his hip, seemed "vigorous and confident,"
     according to a now declassified State Department cable
     obtained by Newsweek. Rumsfeld "conveyed the President's
     greetings and expressed his pleasure at being in Baghdad,"
     wrote the notetaker. Then the two men got down to business,
     talking about the need to improve relations between their two
     countries.
       Like most foreign-policy insiders, Rumsfeld was aware that
     Saddam was a murderous thug who supported terrorists and was
     trying to build a nuclear weapon. (The Israelis had already
     bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak.) But at the time,
     America's big worry was Iran, not Iraq. The Reagan
     administration feared that the Iranian revolutionaries who
     had overthrown the shah (and taken hostage American diplomats
     for 444 days in 1979-81) would overrun the Middle East and
     its vital oilfields. On the--theory that the enemy of my
     enemy is my friend, the Reaganites were seeking to support
     Iraq in a long and bloody war against Iran. The meeting
     between Rumsfeld and Saddam was consequential: for the next
     five years, until Iran finally capitulated, the United States
     backed Saddam's armies with military intelligence, economic
     aid and covert supplies of munitions.
       Rumsfeld is not the first American diplomat to wish for the
     demise of a former ally. After all, before the cold war, the
     Soviet Union was America's partner against Hitler in World
     War II. In the real world, as the saying goes, nations have
     no permanent friends, just permanent interests. Nonetheless,
     Rumsfeld's long-ago interlude with Saddam is a reminder that
     today's friend can be tomorrow's mortal threat. As President
     George W. Bush and his war cabinet ponder Saddam's
     successor's regime, they would do well to contemplate how and
     why the last three presidents allowed the Butcher of Baghdad
     to stay in power so long.
       The history of America's relations with Saddam is one of
     the sorrier tales in American foreign policy. Time and again,
     America turned a blind eye to Saddam's predations, saw him as
     the lesser evil or flinched at the chance to unseat him. No
     single policymaker or administration deserves blame for
     creating, or at least tolerating, a monster; many of their
     decisions seemed reasonable at the time. Even so, there are
     moments in this clumsy dance with the Devil that make one
     cringe. It is hard to believe that, during most of the 1980s,
     America knowingly permitted the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission
     to import bacterial cultures that might be used to build
     biological weapons.

  Let me read that again:

       It is hard to believe that, during most of the 1980s,
     America knowingly permitted the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission
     to import bacterial cultures that might be used to build
     biological weapons. But it happened.
       America's past stumbles, while embarrassing, are not an
     argument for inaction in the future. Saddam probably is the
     "grave and gathering danger" described by President Bush in
     his speech to the United Nations last week. It may also be
     true that "whoever replaces Saddam is not going to be
     worse," as a senior administration official put it to
     Newsweek. But the story of how America helped create a
     Frankenstein monster it now wishes to strangle is sobering.
     It illustrates the power of wishful thinking, as well as the
     iron law of unintended consequences.
       America did not put Saddam in power. He emerged after two
     decades of turmoil in the '60s and '70s, as various strongmen
     tried to gain control of a nation that had been concocted by
     British imperialists in the 1920s out of three distinct and
     rival factions, the Sunnis, Shiites and the Kurds. But during
     the cold war, America competed with the Soviets for Saddam's
     attention and welcomed his war with the religious fanatics of
     Iran. Having cozied up to Saddam, Washington found it hard to
     break away--even after going to war with him in 1991. Through
     years of both tacit and overt support, the West helped create
     the Saddam of today, giving him time to build deadly arsenals
     and dominate his people. Successive administrations always
     worried that if Saddam fell, chaos would follow, rippling
     through the region and possibly igniting another Middle East
     war. At times it seemed that Washington was transfixed by
     Saddam.
       The Bush administration wants to finally break the spell.
     If the administration's true believers are right, Baghdad,
     after Saddam falls will look something like Paris after the
     Germans fled in August 1944. American troops will be cheered
     as liberators, and democracy will spread forth and push
     Middle Eastern despotism back into the shadows. Yet if the
     gloomy predictions of the administration's many critics come
     true, the Arab street, inflamed by Yankee imperialism, will
     rise up and replace the shaky but friendly autocrats in the
     region with Islamic fanatics.
       While the Middle East is unlikely to become a democratic
     nirvana, the worst-case scenarios, always a staple of the
     press, are probably also wrong or exaggerated. Assuming that
     a cornered and doomed Saddam does not kill thousands of
     Americans in some kind of horrific Gotterdammerung--a scary
     possibility, one that deeply worries administration
     officials--the greatest risk of his fall is that one
     strongman may simply be replaced by another. Saddam's
     successor may not be a paranoid sadist. But there is no
     assurance that he will be America's friend or forswear the
     development of weapons of mass destruction.
       American officials have known that Saddam was a
     psychopath--

  Get that.

       American officials have known that Saddam was a psychopath
     ever since he became the country's de facto ruler in the
     early 1970s. One of Saddam's early acts after he took the
     title of president in 1979 was to videotape a session of his
     party's congress, during which he personally ordered several
     members executed on the spot.

  Let me repeat that:

       American officials have known that Saddam was a psychopath
     ever since he became the country's de facto ruler in the
     early 1970s. One of Saddam's early acts after he took the
     title of president in 1979 was to videotape--

  Videotape--

     a session of his party's congress, during which he personally
     ordered several members executed on the spot.
       The message, carefully conveyed to the Arab press, was not
     that these men were executed for plotting against Saddam, but
     rather for thinking about plotting against him. From the
     beginning, U.S. officials worried about Saddam's taste for
     nasty weaponry; indeed, at their meeting in 1983, Rumsfeld
     warned that Saddam's use of chemical weapons might
     "inhibit" American assistance. But top officials in the
     Reagan administration saw Saddam as a useful surrogate. By
     going to war with Iran, he could bleed the radical mullahs
     who had seized control of Iran from the pro-American shah.
     Some Reagan officials even saw Saddam as another Anwar Sadat,
     capable of making Iraq into a modern secular state, just as
     Sadat had tried to lift up Egypt before his assassination in
     1981.
       But Saddam had to be rescued first. The war against Iran
     was going badly by 1982. Iran's "human wave attacks"
     threatened to overrun Saddam's armies. Washington decided to
     give Iraq a helping hand.
       After Rumsfeld's visit to Baghdad in 1983, U.S.
     intelligence began supplying the Iraqi dictator with
     satellite photos showing Iranian deployments. Official
     documents suggest that America may also have secretly
     arranged for tanks and other military hardware to be shipped
     to Iraq in a swap deal--American tanks to Egypt, Egyptian
     tanks to Iraq. Over the protest of some Pentagon skeptics,
     the Reagan administration began allowing the Iraqis to buy a
     wide variety of "dual use" equipment and materials from
     American suppliers. According to confidential Commerce
     Department export-control documents obtained by NEWSWEEK, the
     shopping list included a computerized database for Saddam's
     Interior Ministry (presumably to help keep track of political
     opponents); helicopters to transport Iraqi officials;
     television cameras for "video surveillance applications";
     chemical-analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy
     Commission (IAEC), and, most unsettling, numerous shipments
     of "bacteria/fungi/protozoa" to the IAEC. According to
     former officials, the bacterial cultures could be used to
     make biological weapons, including anthrax. The State
     Department also approved the shipment of 1.5 million atropine
     injectors, for use against the effects of chemical weapons,
     but the Pentagon blocked the sale. The helicopters, some
     American officials later surmised, were used to spray poison
     gas on the Kurds.
       The United States almost certainly knew from its own
     satellite imagery that Saddam was using chemical weapons
     against Iranian troops. When Saddam bombed Kurdish rebels and
     civilians with a lethal cocktail of mustard gas, sarin, tabun
     and VX in 1988, the

[[Page S8988]]

     Reagan administration first blamed Iran, before
     acknowledging, under pressure from congressional Democrats,
     that the culprits were Saddam's own forces. There was only
     token official protest at the time. Saddam's men were
     unfazed. An Iraqi audiotape, later captured by the Kurds,
     records Saddam's cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid (known as Ali
     Chemical) talking to his fellow officers about gassing the
     Kurds. "Who is going to say anything?" he asks. "The
     international community? F----k them!"
       The United States was much more concerned with protecting
     Iraqi oil from attacks by Iran as it was shipped through the
     Persian Gulf. In 1987, an Iraqi Exocet missile hit an
     American destroyer, the USS Stark, in the Persian Gulf,
     killing 37 crewmen. Incredibly, the United States excused
     Iraq for making an unintentional mistake and instead used the
     incident to accuse Iran of escalating the war in the gulf.
     The American tilt to Iraq became more pronounced. U.S.
     commandos began blowing up Iranian oil platforms and
     attacking Iranian patrol boats. In 1988, an American warship
     in the gulf accidentally shot down an Iranian Airbus, killing
     290 civilians. Within a few weeks, Iran, exhausted and
     fearing American intervention, gave up its war with Iraq.
       Saddam was feeling cocky. With the support of the West, he
     had defeated the Islamic revolutionaries in Iran. America
     favored him as a regional pillar; European and American
     corporations were vying for contracts with Iraq. He was
     visited by congressional delegations led by Sens. Bob Dole of
     Kansas and Alan Simpson of Wyoming, who were eager to promote
     American farm and business interests. But Saddam's
     megalomania was on the rise, and he overplayed his hand. In
     1990, a U.S. Customs sting operation snared several Iraqi
     agents who were trying to buy electronic equipment used to
     make triggers for nuclear bombs. Not long after, Saddam
     gained the world's attention by threatening "to burn Israel
     to the ground." At the Pentagon, analysts began to warn that
     Saddam was a growing menace, especially after he tried to buy
     some American-made high-tech furnaces useful for making
     nuclear-bomb parts. Yet other officials in Congress and in
     the Bush administration continued to see him as a useful, if
     distasteful, regional strongman. The State Department was
     equivocating with Saddam right up to the moment he invaded
     Kuwait in August 1990.

  Mr. President, I referred to this Newsweek article yesterday at a
hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Specifically, during
the hearing, I asked Secretary Rumsfeld:

       Mr. Secretary, to your knowledge, did the United States
     help Iraq to acquire the building blocks of biological
     weapons during the Iran-Iraq war? Are we in fact now facing
     the possibility of reaping what we have sewn?

  The Secretary quickly and flatly denied any knowledge but said he
would review Pentagon records.
  I suggest that the administration speed up that review. My concerns
and the concerns of others have grown.
  A letter from the Centers For Disease Control and Prevention, which I
shall submit for the Record, shows very clearly that the United States
is, in fact, preparing to reap what it has sewn. A letter written in
1995 by former CDC Director David Satcher to former Senator Donald W.
Riegle, Jr., points out that the U.S. Government provided nearly two
dozen viral and bacterial samples to Iraqi scientists in 1985--samples
that included the plague, botulism, and anthrax, among other deadly
diseases.
  According to the letter from Dr. Satcher to former Senator Donald
Riegle, many of the materials were hand carried by an Iraqi scientist
to Iraq after he had spent 3 months training in the CDC laboratory.
  The Armed Services Committee is requesting information from the
Departments of Commerce, State, and Defense on the history of the
United States, providing the building blocks for weapons of mass
destruction to Iraq. I recommend that the Department of Health and
Human Services also be included in that request.
  The American people do not need obfuscation and denial. The American
people need the truth. The American people need to know whether the
United States is in large part responsible for the very Iraqi weapons
of mass destruction which the administration now seeks to destroy.
  We may very well have created the monster that we seek to eliminate.
The Senate deserves to know the whole story. The American people
deserve answers to the whole story.
  Also yesterday, in the same 6 minutes that I was given in which to
ask questions--which was extended by virtue of the kindness of the
distinguished Senator from Georgia, Mr. Max Cleland, and other members
of the committee, so it was perhaps 9 or 10 minutes--there was another
interesting question that I asked. Let me read a portion of that
transcript from the Armed Services Committee:

       Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these hearings. Mr.
     Secretary, to your knowledge, did the United States help Iraq
     to acquire the building blocks of biological weapons during
     the Iran-Iraq War? Are we, in fact, now facing the
     possibility of reaping what we have sown?
       Rumsfeld: Certainly not to my knowledge. I have no
     knowledge of United States companies or government being
     involved in assisting Iraq develop chemical, biological or
     nuclear weapons.

  There is another excerpt from that question and answer period in
which Secretary Rumsfeld and I engaged:

       Byrd: Now, the Washington Post reported this morning
     [yesterday] that the United States is stepping away from
     efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. Are
     we not sending exactly the wrong signal to the world, at
     exactly the wrong time?
       Doesn't this damage our credibility in the international
     community at the very time that we are seeking their support
     to neutralize the threat of Iraq's biological weapons
     program? If we supplied, as the Newsweek article said, if we
     supplied the building blocks for germ and chemical warfare to
     this madman in the first place, this psychopath, how do we
     look to the world to be backing away from this effort to
     control it at this point?

  That question speaks for itself. I ask unanimous consent that the
following material be printed in the Record at the close of my remarks:
The partial transcript from the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing
on September 19; the article from the Washington Post of yesterday,
titled "U.S. Drops Bid to Strengthen Germ Warfare Accord"; the
Newsweek article, which I have alluded to already; a letter dated
January 6, 1994, requesting information from the Centers for Disease
Control and a response to the Honorable Donald W. Riegle, Jr., U.S.
Senator, dated June 21, 1995, from David Satcher, M.D., Ph.D.,
Director; a U.S. Senate Hearing Report 103-900, dealing with U.S.
exports of biological materials to Iraq to the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs which has oversight responsibility
for the Export Administration Act, and keeping in mind that the U.S.
Department of Commerce approves licenses by that Department for
exports; including also the U.S. Senate hearing report in that matter.
Included in the approved sales are such items as Bacillus Anthracis,
anthrax, Clostridium Botulinum, Histoplasma Capsulatum, which causes a
disease superficially resembling tuberculosis that may cause pneumonia;
Brucella Melitensis, a bacteria which can cause chronic fatigue, and so
on; Clostridium Perfringens, which causes gas gangrene. I believe that
completes the list.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Byrd-Rumsfeld Transcript--Partial Transcript From Senate Armed Services
                     Committee, September 19, 2002

       Levin. Senator Byrd?
       Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these hearings.
       Mr. Secretary, to your knowledge, did the United States
     help Iraq to acquire the building blocks of biological
     weapons during the Iran-Iraq War? Are we, in fact, now facing
     the possibility of reaping what we have sown?
       Rumsfeld. Certainly not to my knowledge. I have no
     knowledge of United States companies or government being
     involved in assisting Iraq develop chemical, biological or
     nuclear weapons.
       Byrd. Mr. Secretary, let me read to you from the September
     23, 2002, Newsweek story. I read this, I read excerpts,
     because my time is limited.
       "Some Reagan officials even saw Saddam as another Anwar
     Sadat, capable of making Iraq into a modern secular state,
     just as Sadat had tried to lift up Egypt before his
     assassination in 1981. But Saddam had to be rescued first.
     The war against Iran was going badly by 1982."
       Byrd. "Iran's human-wave attacks threatened to overrun
     Saddam's armies. Washington decided to give Iraq a helping
     hand. After Rumsfeld's visit to Baghdad in 1982, U.S.
     intelligence began supplying the Iraqi dictator with
     satellite photos showing Iranian deployments.
       "Official documents suggest that America may also have
     secretly arranged for tanks and other military hardware to be
     shipped to Iraq in a swap deal: American tanks to Egypt,
     Egyptian tanks to Iraq.
       "Over the protest of some Pentagon skeptics, the Reagan
     administration began allowing the Iraqis to buy a wide
     variety of, quote, `dual-use,' close quote, equipment and
     materials from American suppliers.
       "According to confidential Commerce Department export
     control documents obtained

[[Page S8989]]

     by Newsweek, the shopping list included a computerized
     database for Saddam's Interior Ministry, presumably to help
     keep track of political opponents, helicopters to help
     transport Iraqi officials, television cameras for video
     surveillance applications, chemical analysis equipment for
     the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission, IAEC, and, most
     unsettling, numerous shipments of the bacteria, fungi,
     protozoa to the IAEC.
       "According to former officials the bacterial cultures
     could be used to make biological weapons, including anthrax.
     The State Department also approved the shipment of 1.5
     million atropine injectors for use against the effects of
     chemical weapons but the Pentagon blocked the sale.
       "The helicopters, some American officials later surmised,
     were used to spray poison gas on the Kurds. The United States
     almost certainly knew from its own satellite imagery that
     Saddam was using chemical weapons against Iranian troops.
       "When Saddam bombed Kurdish rebels and civilians with a
     lethal cocktail of mustard gas, sarin, tabun and VX in 1988,
     the Reagan administration first blamed Iran before
     acknowledging, under pressure from congressional Democrats,
     that the culprit were Saddam's own forces. There was only
     token official protest at the time. Saddam's men were
     unfazed.
       "An Iraqi audiotape later captured by the Kurds records
     Saddam's cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as Ali Chemical,
     talking to his fellow officers about gassing the Kurds.
     Quote, `Who is going to say anything?' close quote, he asks,
     `the international community? F-blank them!' exclamation
     point, close quote."
       Now can this possibly be true? We already knew that Saddam
     was dangerous man at the time. I realize that you were not in
     public office at the time, but you were dispatched to Iraq by
     President Reagan to talk about the need to improve relations
     between Iraq and the U.S.
       Let me ask you again: To your knowledge did the United
     States help Iraq to acquire the building blocks of biological
     weapons during the Iran-Iraq war? Are we, in fact, now facing
     the possibility of reaping what we have sown?
       The Washington Post reported this morning that the United
     States is stepping away from efforts to strengthen the
     Biological Weapons Convention. I'll have a question on that
     later.
       Let me ask you again: Did the United States help Iraq to
     acquire the building blocks of biological weapons during the
     Iran-Iraq War? Are we, in fact, now facing the possibility of
     reaping what we have sown?
       Rumsfeld. I have not read the article. As you suggest, I
     was, for a period in late '83 and early '84, asked by
     President Reagan to serve as Middle East envoy after the
     Marines--241 Marines were killed in Beirut.
       As part of my responsibilities I did visit Baghdad. I did
     meet with Mr. Tariq Aziz. And I did meet with Saddam Hussein
     and spent some time visiting with them about the war they
     were engaged in with Iran.
       At the time our concern, of course, was Syria and Syria's
     role in Lebanon and Lebanon's role in the Middle East and the
     terrorist acts that were taking place.
       As a private citizen I was assisting only for a period
     of months. I have never heard anything like what you've
     read, I have no knowledge of it whatsoever, and I doubt
     it.
       Byrd. You doubt what?
       Rumsfeld. The questions you posed as to whether the United
     States of America assisted Iraq with the elements that you
     listed in your reading of Newsweek and that we could
     conceivably now be reaping what we've sown.
       I think--I doubt both.
       Byrd. Are you surprised that this is what I've said? Are
     you surprised at this story in Newsweek?
       Rumsfeld. I guess I'm at an age and circumstance in life
     where I'm no longer surprised about what I hear in the
     newspapers.
       Byrd. That's not the question, I'm of that age, too.
     Somewhat older than you, but how about that story I've read?
       Rumsfeld. I see stories all the time that are flat wrong. I
     just don't know. All I can say . . .
       Byrd. How about this story? This story? How about this
     story, specifically?
       Rumsfeld. As I say, I have not read it, I listened
     carefully to what you said and I doubt it.
       Byrd. All right.
       Now the Washington Post reported this morning that the
     United States is stepping away from efforts to strengthen the
     Biological Weapons Convention. Are we not sending exactly the
     wrong signal to the world, at exactly the wrong time?
       Byrd. Doesn't this damage our credibility in the
     international community at the very time that we are seeking
     their support to neutralize the threat of Iraq's biological
     weapons program? If we supplied, as the Newsweek article
     said, if we supplied the building blocks for germ and
     chemical warfare to this madman in the first place, this
     psychopath, how do we look to the world to be backing away
     from this effort to control it at this point?
       Rumsfeld. Senator, I think it would be a shame to leave
     this committee and the people listening with the impression
     that the United States assisted Iraq with chemical or
     biological weapons in the 1980s. I just do not believe that's
     the case.
       Byrd. Well, are you saying that the Newsweek article is
     inaccurate?
       Rumsfeld. I'm saying precisely what I said, that I didn't
     read the Newsweek article, but that I doubt it's accurate.
       Byrd. I'll be glad to send you up a copy.
       Rumsfeld. But that I was not in government at that time,
     except as a special envoy for a period of months. So one
     ought not to rely on me as the best source as to what
     happened in that mid-'80s period that you were describing.
       I will say one other thing. On two occasions I believe when
     you read that article, you mentioned the IAEC, which as I
     recall is the International Atomic Energy Commission, and
     mentioned that if some of the things that you were talking
     about were provided to them, which I found quite confusing to
     be honest.
       With respect to the Biological Weapons Convention, I was
     not aware that the United States government had taken a
     position with respect to it. It's not surprising because it's
     a matter for the Department of State, not the Department of
     Defense.
       If in fact they have indicated, as The Washington Post
     reports, that they are not going to move forward with a--I
     believe it's an enforcement regime, it's not my place to
     discuss the administration's position when I don't know what
     it is.
       But I can tell you, from a personal standpoint, my
     recollection is that the biological convention never, never
     was anticipated that there would even be thought of to have
     an enforcement regime. And that an enforcement regime on
     something like that, where there are a lot of countries
     involved who are on the terrorist list who were participants
     in that convention, that the United States has, over a period
     of administrations, believed that it would not be a good
     idea, because the United States would be a net loser from an
     enforcement regime.
       But that is not the administration's position. I just don't
     know what the administration's position is.
       Levin. We're going to have to leave it there, because
     you're way over.
       Byrd. This is a very important question.
       Levin. It is indeed, and you're over time, I agree with you
     on the importance, but you're way over time, sir.
       Byrd. I know I'm over time, but are we going to leave this
     in question out there dangling?
       Levin. One last question.
       Byrd. I ask unanimous consent that I may have an additional
     five minutes.
       Levin. No, I'm afraid you can't do that. If you could just
     do one last--well, wait a minute, ask unanimous consent, I
     can't stop you from doing that.
       (Unknown). I object.
       (Laughter)
       Byrd. Mr. Chairman?
       Levin. Just one last question. Would that be all right so
     you could wind that up?
       Senator Byrd, if you could just take one additional
     question.
       Byrd. I've never--I've been in this Congress 50 years. I've
     never objected to another senator having a few additional
     minutes.
       Now Mr. Chairman, I think that the secretary should have a
     copy of this report, this story that--from Newsweek that I've
     been querying him about. I think he has a right to look at
     that.
       Levin. Could somebody take that out to the secretary?
       Byrd. Now, while that's being given to the secretary, Mr.
     Secretary, I think we're put into an extremely bad position
     before the world today if we're going to walk away from an
     international effort to strengthen the Biological Weapons
     Convention against germ warfare, advising its allies that the
     U.S. wants to delay further discussions until 2006.
     Especially in the light of the Newsweek story; I think we
     bear some responsibility.
       Inhofe. Mr. Chairman I ask for a point of order.
       Levin. Can we just have this be the last question, if you
     would just go along with us please, Senator Inhofe?
       Inhofe. I'll only say though, in all respect to the Senator
     from West Virginia, we have a number of senators here. We
     have a limited time of six minutes each, and we're entitled
     to have our six minutes. That should be a short questions if
     it's the last question.
       Levin. If we could just make that the last question and
     answer, I would appreciate it. The chair would appreciate the
     cooperation of all senators.
       Secretary Rumsfeld, could you answer that question please?
       Rumsfeld. I'll do my best.
       Senator, I just in glancing at this, and I hesitate to do
     this because I have not read it carefully.
       But it says here that, "According to confidential Commerce
     Department export control documents obtained by Newsweek, the
     shopping list included." It did not say that there were
     deliveries of these things. It said that Iran--Iraq asked for
     these things. It talks about a shopping list.
       Second, in listing these things, it says that they wanted
     television cameras for video surveillance applications,
     chemical analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy
     Commission, the IAEC--and that may very well be the Iraqi
     Atomic Energy Commission, which would be--mean that my
     earlier comment would not be correct, because I thought it
     was the International Atomic Energy Commission. But this
     seems to indicate it's the Iraq Commerce Commission.
       Byrd. Mr. Chairman, may I say to my friend from Oklahoma,
     I'm amazed that he himself wouldn't yield me time for this
     important question. I would do the same for him.
       Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask . . .

[[Page S8990]]

       (Cleland). I yield my five minutes, Senator.
       Byrd. I thank the distinguished Senator.
       Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the secretary--and I
     don't just like to ask him--I asked him to review Pentagon
     records to see if the Newsweek article is true or not. Will
     the secretary do that?
       Rumsfeld. It appears that they're Department of Commerce
     records, as opposed to Pentagon. But I can certainly ask that
     the Department of Commerce and, to the extent that it's
     relevant, the Department of State, look into it and see if we
     can't determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of some aspects of
     this. Yes, sir.
       Levin. And we go one step further than that. I think the
     request is that the Defense Department search its records.
     Will you do that?
       Rumsfeld. We'll be happy to search ours, but this refers to
     the Commerce Department.
       Levin. We will ask the State Department and the Commerce
     Department to do the same thing.
       Rumsfeld. We'd be happy to.
       Levin. And we will also ask the Intelligence Committee to
     stage a briefing for all of us on that issue, so that Senator
     Byrd's question. . .
       Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman.
       Levin. Thank you very much, Senator.
       Byrd. I thank the secretary.
       Rumsfeld. Thank you.
       Levin. Senator Byrd, we will ask Senator Graham and Senator
     Shelby to hold a briefing on that subject, because it is a
     very important subject.
       Byrd. I thank the chairman.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, Sept. 19, 2002]

            U.S. Drops Bid To Strengthen Germ Warfare Accord

                           (By Peter Slevin)

       The Bush administration has abandoned an international
     effort to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention
     against germ warfare, advising its allies that the United
     States wants to delay further discussions until 2006. A
     review conference on new verification measures for the treaty
     has been scheduled for November.
       Less than a year after a State Department envoy abruptly
     pulled out of biowarfare negotiations in Geneva, promising
     that the United States would return with new proposals, the
     administration has concluded that treaty revisions favored by
     the European Union and scores of other countries will not
     work and should not be salvaged, administration officials
     said yesterday.
       The decision, which has been conveyed to allies in recent
     weeks, has been greeted with warnings that the move will
     weaken attempts to curb germ warfare programs at a time when
     biological weapons are a focus of concern because of the war
     on terrorism and the administration's threats to launch a
     military campaign against Iraq. It also comes as the
     administration, which has angered allies by rejecting a
     series of multilateral agreements, is appealing to the
     international community to work with it in forging a new U.N.
     Security Council resolution on Iraq's programs to develop
     weapons of mass destruction.
       The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which has been
     ratified by the United States and 143 other countries, bans
     the development, stockpiling and production of germ warfare
     agents, but has no enforcement mechanism. Negotiations on
     legally binding measures to enforce compliance have been
     underway in Geneva for seven years.
       The administration stunned its allies last December by
     proposing to end the negotiators' mandate, saying that while
     the treaty needed strengthening, the enforcement protocol
     under discussion would not deter enemy nations from acquiring
     or developing biological weapons if they were determined to
     do so. Negotiators suspended the discussions, saying they
     would meet again in November when U.S. officials said they
     would return with creative solutions to address the impasse.
       Instead, U.S. envoys are now telling allies that the
     administration's position is so different from the views of
     the leading supporters of the enforcement protocol that a
     meeting would dissolve into public squabbling and should be
     avoided, administration officials said. Better, they said, to
     halt discussions altogether.
       "It's based on an incorrect approach. Our concern is that
     it would be fundamentally ineffective," a State Department
     official said. Another administration official said the
     "best and least contentious" approach would be to hold a
     very brief meeting in November--or even no meeting at all--
     and talk again when the next review is scheduled four years
     from now.
       Amy Smithson, a biological and chemical weapons specialist,
     said the administration is making a mistake by halting
     collaborative work to strengthen the convention. "It sounds
     to me as though they've thrown the baby out with the bath
     water," said Smithson, an analyst at the Henry L. Stimson
     Center. "The contradiction between the rhetoric and what the
     administration is actually doing--the gulf is huge. Not a day
     goes by when they don't mention the Iraq threat."
       The Stimson Center is releasing a report today that
     criticizes the U.S. approach to the convention. Drawn from a
     review by 10 pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology
     experts, the document argues that bioweapons inspections can
     be effective with the right amount of time and the right
     science and urges the administration to develop stronger
     measures.
       "To argue that this wouldn't be a useful remedy would just
     be a mistake. I think it's because they're looking through
     the wrong end of the telescope," said Matthew Meselson, a
     Harvard biologist who helped draft a treaty to criminalize
     biological weapons violations. "We're denying ourselves
     useful tools."
       The administration has focused publicly on a half-dozen
     countries identified by the State Department as pursuing germ
     warfare programs. Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton said
     the existence of Iraq's bioweapons project is "beyond
     dispute." The U.S. government also believes Iran, North
     Korea, Sudan, Libya and Syria are developing such weapons, he
     said.
       Meselson concurred with the administration's position that
     a limited enforcement provision for the bioweapons treaty
     could not provide confidence that countries are staying
     clean. But he said that a pact establishing standards and
     verification measures would deter some countries while also
     helping to build norms of international behavior.
       Bolton, on the other hand, told delegates to last year's
     review conference that "the time for `better-than-nothing'
     protocols is over. We will continue to reject flawed texts
     like the BWC draft protocol, recommended to us simply because
     they are the product of lengthy negotiations or arbitrary
     deadlines, if such texts are not in the best interests of the
     United States."
       With only hours to go at the meeting, Bolton stopped U.S.
     participation in the final negotiations. He said of the
     resulting one-year delay, "This gives us time to think
     creatively on alternatives."
       In Bolton's view, each country should develop criminal laws
     against germ warfare activities, develop export controls for
     dangerous pathogens, establish codes of conduct for
     scientists and install strict biosafety procedures. The
     administration has proposed that governments resolve disputes
     over biowarfare violations among themselves, perhaps through
     voluntary inspections or by referral to the United Nations
     secretary general.
       Such an approach is "at best ineffectual," said the
     specialists gathered by the Stimson Center. At worst, they
     concluded, the approach could damage U.S. interests because
     it would not be structured to deliver "meaningful
     monitoring."
       "If a challenge inspection system is not geared to pursue
     violators aggressively, then it does not serve U.S. security
     interests," the 65-page report states. The participants
     strongly favored establishing mandatory standards backed by
     penalties and "robust" inspections, which goes
     significantly further than the proposed protocol backed by
     the EU and other nations.
       The State Department Web site has not yet been changed to
     reflect the change in policy. It says, "The United States is
     committed to strengthening the BWC as part of a comprehensive
     and multidisciplinary strategy for combating the
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
     international terrorism. . . . We would like to share these
     ideas with our international partners."
                                  ____


Partial Transcript From Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19,
                                  2002

       Levin. Senator Byrd?
       Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these hearings.
       Mr. Secretary, to your knowledge, did the United States
     help Iraq to acquire the building blocks of biological
     weapons during the Iran-Iraq War? Are we, in fact, now facing
     the possibility of reaping what we have sown?
       Rumsfeld. Certainly not to my knowledge. I have no
     knowledge of United States companies or government being
     involved in assisting Iraq develop chemical, biological or
     nuclear weapons.
       Byrd. Mr. Secretary, let me read to you from the September
     23, 2002, Newsweek story. I read this, I read excerpts,
     because my time is limited.
       "Some Reagan officials even saw Saddam as another Anwar
     Sadat, capable of making Iraq into a modern secular state,
     just as Sadat had tried to lift up Egypt before his
     assassination in 1981. But Saddam had to be rescued first.
     The war against Iran was going badly by 1982."
       "Iran's human-wave attacks threatened to overrun Saddam's
     armies. Washington decided to give Iraq a helping hand. After
     Rumsfeld's visit to Baghdad in 1983, U.S. intelligence began
     supplying the Iraqi dictator with satellite photos showing
     Iranian deployments.
       "Official documents suggest that America may also have
     secretly arranged for tanks and other military hardware to be
     shipped to Iraq in a swap deal: American tanks to Egypt,
     Egyptian tanks to Iraq.
       "Over the protest of some Pentagon skeptics, the Reagan
     administration began allowing the Iraqis to buy a wide
     variety of, quote, `dual-use,' close quote, equipment and
     materials from American suppliers.
       "According to confidential Commerce Department export
     control documents obtained by Newsweek, the shopping list
     include a computerized database for Saddam's Interior
     Ministry, presumably to help keep track of political
     opponents, helicopters to help transport Iraqi officials,
     television cameras for video surveillance applications,
     chemical analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy
     Commission, IAEC, and, most unsettling, numerous shipments of
     the bacteria, fungi, protozoa to the IAEC.

[[Page S8991]]

       "According to former officials the bacterial cultures
     could be used to make biological weapons, including anthrax.
     The State Department also approved the shipment of 1.5
     million atropine injectors for use against the effects of
     chemical weapons but the Pentagon blocked the sale.
       "The helicopters, some American officials later surmised,
     were used to spray poison gas on the Kurds. The United States
     almost certainly knew from its own satellite imagery that
     Saddam was using chemical weapons against Iranian troops.
       "When Saddam bombed Kurdish rebels and civilians with a
     lethal cocktail of mustard gas, sarin, tabun and VX in 1988,
     the Reagan administration first blamed Iran before
     acknowledging, under pressure from congressional Democrats,
     that the culprit were Saddam's own forces. There was only
     token official protest at the time. Saddam's men were
     unfazed.
       "An Iraqi audiotape later captured by the Kurds records
     Saddam's cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as Ali Chemical,
     talking to his fellow officers about gassing the Kurds.
     Quote, `Who is going to say anything?' close quote, he asks,
     `the international community? F-blank them!' exclamation
     point, close quote."
       Now can this possibly be true? We already knew that Saddam
     was dangerous man at the time. I realize that you were not in
     public office at the time, but you were dispatched to Iraq by
     President Reagan to talk about the need to improve relations
     between Iraq and the U.S.
       Let me ask you again: To your knowledge did the United
     States help Iraq to acquire the building blocks of biological
     weapons during the Iran-Iraq war? Are we, in fact, now facing
     the possibility of reaping what we have sown?
       The Washington Post reported this morning that the United
     is stepping away from efforts to strengthen the Biological
     Weapons Convention. I'll have a question on that later.
       Let me ask you again: Did the United States help Iraq to
     acquire the building blocks of biological weapons during the
     Iran-Iraq War? Are we, in fact, now facing the possibility of
     reaping what we have sown?
       Rumsfeld. I have not read the article. As you suggest, I
     was, for a period in late `83 and early `84, asked by
     President Reagan to serve as Middle East envoy after the
     Marines--241 Marines were killed in Beirut.
       As part of my responsibilities I did visit Baghdad. I did
     meet with Mr. Tariq Aziz. And I did meet with Saddam Hussein
     and spent some time visiting with them about the war they
     were engaged in with Iran.
       At the time our concern, of course, was Syria and Syria's
     role in Lebanon and Lebanon's role in the Middle East and the
     terrorist acts that were taking place.
       As a private citizen I was assisting only for a period
     of months. I have never heard anything like what you've
     read, I have no knowledge of it whatsoever, and I doubt
     it.
       Byrd. You doubt what?
       Rumsfeld. The questions you posed as to whether the United
     States of America assisted Iraq with the elements that you
     listed in your reading of Newsweek and that we could
     conceivably now be reaping what we've sown.
       I think--I doubt both.
       Byrd. Are you surprised that this is what I've said? Are
     you surprised at this story in Newsweek?
       Rumsfeld. I guess I'm at an age and circumstance in life
     where I'm no longer surprised about what I hear in the
     newspapers.
       Byrd. That's not the question. I'm of that age, too.
     Somewhat older than you, but how about that story I've read?
       Rumsfeld. I see stories all the time that are flat wrong. I
     just don't know. All I can say . . .
       Byrd. How about this story? This story? How about this
     story, specifically?
       Rumsfeld. As I say, I have not read it, I listened
     carefully to what you said and I doubt it.
       Byrd. All right.
       Now the Washington Post reported this morning that the
     United States is stepping away from efforts to strengthen the
     Biological Weapons Convention. Are we not sending exactly the
     wrong signal to the world, at exactly the wrong time?
       Byrd. Doesn't this damage our credibility in the
     international community at the very time that we are seeking
     their support to neutralize the threat of Iraq's biological
     weapons program? If we supplied, as the Newsweek article
     said, if we supplied the building blocks for germ and
     chemical warfare to this madman in the first place, this
     psychopath, how do we look to the world to be backing away
     from this effort to control it at this point?
       Rumsfeld. Senator, I think it would be a shame to leave
     this committee and the people listening with the impression
     that the United States assisted Iraq with chemical or
     biological weapons in the 1980s. I just do not believe that's
     the case.
       Byrd. Well, are you saying that the Newsweek article is
     inaccurate?
       Rumsfeld. I'm saying precisely what I said, that I didn't
     read the Newsweek article, but that I doubt its accurate.
       Byrd. I'll be glad to send you up a copy.
       Rumsfeld. But that I was not in government at that time,
     except as a special envoy for a period of months. So one
     ought not to rely on me as the best source as to what
     happened in that mid-'80s period that you were describing.
       I will say one other thing. On two occasions I believe when
     you read that article, you mentioned the IAEC, which as I
     recall is the International Atomic Energy Commission, and
     mentioned that if some of the things that you were talking
     about were provided to them, which I found quite confusing to
     be honest.
       With respect to the Biological Weapons Convention, I was
     not aware that the United States government had taken a
     position with respect to it. It's not surprising because it's
     a matter for the Department of State, not the Department of
     Defense.
       If in fact they have indicated, as The Washington Post
     reports, that they are not going to move forward with a--I
     believe it's an enforcement regime, it's not my place to
     discuss the administration's position when I don't know what
     it is.
       But I can tell you, from a personal standpoint, my
     recollection is that the biological convention never, never
     was anticipated that there would even be thought of to have
     an enforcement regime. And that an enforcement regime on
     something like that, where there are a lot of countries
     involved who are on the terrorist list who were participants
     in that convention, that the United States has, over a period
     of administrations, believed that it would not be a good
     idea, because the United States would be a net loser from an
     enforcement regime.
       But that is not the administration's position. I just don't
     know what the administration's position is.
       Levin. We're going to have to leave it there, because
     you're way over.
       Byrd. This is a very important question.
       Levin. It is indeed, and you're over time. I agree with you
     on the importance, but you're way over time, sir.
       Byrd. I know I'm over time, but are we going to leave this
     in question out there dangling?
       Levin. One last question.
       Byrd. I ask unanimous consent that I may have an additional
     five minutes.
       Levin. No, I'm afraid you can't do that. If you could just
     do one last--well, wait a minute, ask unanimous consent, I
     can't stop you from doing that.
       (Unknown). I object.
       (Laughter)
       Byrd. Mr. Chairman?
       Levin. Just one last question. Would that be all right so
     you could wind it up?
       Senator Byrd, if you could just take one additional
     question.
       Byrd. I've never--I've been in this Congress 50 years. I've
     never objected to another senator having a few additional
     minutes.
       Now Mr. Chairman, I think that the secretary should have a
     copy of this report, this story that--from Newsweek that I've
     been querying him about. I think he has a right to look at
     that.
       Levin. Could somebody take that out to the secretary?
       Byrd. Now, while that's being given to the secretary, Mr.
     Secretary, I think we're put into an extremely bad position
     before the world today if we're going to walk away from an
     international effort to strengthen the Biological Weapons
     Convention against germ warfare, advising its allies that the
     U.S. wants to delay further discussions until 2006.,
     Especially in the light of the Newsweek story; I think we
     bear some responsibility.
       Inhofe. Mr. Chairman I ask for a point of order.
       Levin. Can we just have this be the last question, if you
     would just go along with us please, Senator Inhofe?
       Inhofe. I'll only say though, in all respect to the senator
     from West Virginia, we have a number of senators here. We
     have a limited time of six minutes each, and we're entitled
     to have our six minutes. That should be a short question if
     it's the last question.
       Levin. If we could just make that the last question and
     answer, I would appreciate it. The chair would appreciate the
     cooperation of all senators.
       Rumsfeld. I'll do my best.
       Senator, I just in glancing at this, and I hesitate to do
     this because I have not read it carefully.
       But it says here that, "According to confidential Commerce
     Department export control documents obtained by Newsweek, the
     shopping list included." It did not say that there were
     deliveries of these things. It said that Iran--Iraq asked for
     these things. It talks about a shopping list.
       Second, in listing these things, it says that they wanted
     television cameras for video surveillance applications,
     chemical analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy
     Commission, the IAEC--and that may very well be the Iraqi
     Atomic Energy Commission, which would be--mean that my
     earlier comment would not be correct, because I thought it
     was the International Atomic Energy Commission. But this
     seems to indicate it's the Iraq Commerce Commission.
       Byrd. Mr. Chairman, may I say to my friend from Oklahoma,
     I'm amazed that he himself wouldn't yield me time for this
     important question. I would do the same for him.
       Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask . . .
       (Cleland). I yield my five minutes, Senator.
       Byrd. I thank the distinguished senator.
       Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the secretary--and I
     don't just like to ask him--I ask him to review Pentagon
     records to see if the Newsweek article is true or not. Will
     the secretary do that?
       Rumsfeld. It appears that they're Department of Commerce
     records, as opposed to Pentagon. But I can certainly ask that
     the

[[Page S8992]]

     Department of Commerce and, to the extent that it's relevant,
     the Department of State, look into it and see if we can't
     determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of some aspects of this.
     Yes, sir.
       Levin. And we go one step future than that. I think the
     request is that the Defense Department search its records.
     Will you do that?
       Rumsfeld. We'll be happy to search ours, but this refers to
     the Commerce Department.
       Levin. We will ask the State Department and the Commerce
     Department to do the same thing.
       Rumsfeld. We'd be happy to.
       Levin. And we will also ask the Intelligence Committee to
     stage a briefing for all of us on that issue, so that Senator
     Byrd's question . . .
       Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman.
       Levin. Thank you very much, Senator.
       Byrd. I thank the secretary.
       Rumsfeld. Thank you.
       Levin. Senator Byrd, we will ask Senator Graham and Senator
     Shelby to hold a briefing on that subject, because it is a
     very important subject.
       Byrd. I thank the chairman.
                                  ____


                    [From Newsweek, Sept. 23, 2002]

                          How Saddam Happened

                (By Christopher Dickey and Evan Thomas)

       The last time Donald Rumsfeld saw Saddam Hussein, he gave
     him a cordial handshake. The date was almost 20 years ago,
     Dec. 20, 1983; an official Iraqi television crew recorded the
     historic moment.
       The once and future Defense secretary, at the time a
     private citizen, had been sent by President Ronald Reagan to
     Baghdad as a special envoy. Saddam Hussein, armed with a
     pistol on his hip, seemed "vigorous and confident,"
     according to a new declassified State Department cable
     obtained by Newsweek. Rumsfeld "conveyed the President's
     greetings and expressed his pleasure at being in Baghdad,"
     wrote the notetaker. Then the two men got down to business,
     talking about the need to improve relations between their two
     countries.
       Like most foreign-policy insiders, Rumsfeld was aware that
     Saddam was a murderous thug who supported terrorists and was
     trying to build a nuclear weapon. (The Israelis had already
     bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak.) But at the time,
     America's big worry was Iran, not Iraq. The Reagan
     administration feared that the Iranian revolutionaries who
     had overthrown the shah (and taken hostage American diplomats
     for 444 days in 1979-81) would overrun the Middle East and
     its vital oilfields. On the theory that the enemy of my enemy
     is my friend, the Reaganites were seeking to support Iraq in
     a long and bloody war against Iran. The meeting between
     Rumsfeld and Saddam was consequential: for the next five
     years, until Iran finally capitulated, the United States
     backed Saddam's armies with military intelligence, economic
     aid and covert supplies of munitions.


                             former allies

       Rumsfeld is not the first American diplomat to wish for the
     demise of a former ally. After all, before the cold war, the
     Soviet Union was America's partner against Hitler in World
     War II. In the real world, as the saying goes, nations have
     no permanent friends, just permanent interests. Nonetheless,
     Rumsfeld's long-ago interlude with Saddam is a reminder that
     today's friend can be tomorrow's mortal threat. As President
     George W. Bush and his war cabinet ponder Saddam's
     successor's regime, they would do well to contemplate how and
     why the last three presidents allowed the Butcher of Baghdad
     to stay in power so long.
       The history of America's relations with Saddam is one of
     the sorrier tales in American foreign policy. Time and again,
     America turned a blind eye to Saddam's predations, saw him as
     the lesser evil or flinched at the chance to unseat him. No
     single policymaker or administration deserves blame for
     creating, or at least tolerating, a monster; many of their
     decisions seemed reasonable at the time. Even so, there are
     moments in this clumsy dance with the Devil that make one
     cringe. It is hard to believe that, during most of the 1980s,
     America knowingly permitted the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission
     to import bacterial cultures that might be used to build
     biological weapons. But it happened.
       America's past stumbles, while embarrassing, are not an
     argument for inaction in the future. Saddam probably is the
     "grave and gathering danger" described by President Bush in
     his speech to the United Nations last week. It may also be
     true that "whoever replaces Saddam is not going to be
     worse," as a senior administration official put it to
     Newsweek. But the story of how America helped create a
     Frankenstein monster it now wishes to strangle is sobering.
     It illustrates the power of wishful thinking, as well as the
     iron law of unintended consequences.


                          transfixed by saddam

       America did not put Saddam in power. He emerged after two
     decades of turmoil in the '60s and '70s, as various strongmen
     tried to gain control of a nation that had been concocted by
     British imperialists in the 1920s out of three distinct and
     rival factions, the Sunnis, Shiites and the Kurds. But during
     the cold war, America competed with the Soviets for Saddam's
     attention and welcomed his war with the religious fanatics of
     Iran. Having cozied up to Saddam, Washington. . . .
       While the Middle East is unlikely to become a democratic
     nirvana, the worst-case scenarios, always a staple of the
     press, are probably also wrong or exaggerated. Assuming that
     a cornered and doomed Saddam does not kill thousands of
     Americans in some kind of horrific Gotterdammerung--a scary
     possibility, one that deeply worries administration
     officials--the greatest risk of his fall is that one
     strongman may simply be replaced by another. Saddam's
     successor may not be a paranoid sadist. But there is no
     assurance that he will be America's friend or forswear the
     development of weapons of mass destruction.


                       a taste for nasty weapons

       American officials have known that Saddam was a psychopath
     ever since he became the country's de facto ruler in the
     early 1970s. One of Saddam's early acts after he took the
     title of president in 1979 was to videotape a session of his
     party's congress, during which he personally ordered several
     members executed on the spot. The message, carefully conveyed
     to the Arab press, was not that these men were executed for
     plotting against Saddam, but rather for thinking about
     plotting against him. From the beginning, U.S. officials
     worried about Saddam's taste for nasty weaponry; indeed, at
     their meeting in 1983, Rumsfeld warned that Saddam's use of
     chemical weapons might "inhibit" American assistance. But
     top officials in the Reagan administration saw Saddam as a
     useful surrogate. By going to war with Iran, he could bleed
     the radical mullahs who had seized control of Iran from the
     pro-American shah. Some Reagan officials even saw Saddam as
     another Anwar Sadat, capable of making Iran into a modern
     secular state, just as Sadat had tried to lift up Egypt
     before his assassination in 1981.
       But Saddam had to be rescued first. The war against Iran
     was going badly by 1982. Iran's "human wave attacks"
     threatened to overrun Saddam's armies. Washington decided to
     give Iraq a helping hand. After Rumsfeld's visit to Baghdad
     in 1983, U.S. intelligence began supplying the Iraqi dictator
     with satellite photos showing Iranian deployments. Official
     documents suggest that America may also have secretly
     arranged for tanks and other military hardware to be shipped
     to Iraq in a swap deal--American tanks to Egypt, Egyptian
     tanks to Iraq. Over the protest of some Pentagon skeptics,
     the Reagan administration began allowing the Iraqis to buy a
     wide variety of "dual use" equipment and materials from
     American suppliers. According to confidential Commerce
     Department export-control documents obtained by Newsweek, the
     shopping list included a computerized database for Saddam's
     Interior Ministry (presumably to help keep track of political
     opponents); helicopters to transport Iraqi officials;
     television cameras for "video surveillance applications";
     chemical-analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy
     Commission (IAEC), and, most unsettling, numerous shipments
     of "bacteria/fungi/protozoa" to the IAEC. According to
     former officials, the bacteria cultures could be used to make
     biological weapons, including anthrax. The State Department
     also approved the shipment of 1.5 million atropine injectors,
     for use against the effects of chemical weapons, but the
     Pentagon blocked the sale. The helicopters, some American
     officials later surmised, were used to spray poison gas on
     the Kurds.


                   "who is going to say anything?"

       The United States almost certainly knew from its own
     satellite imagery that Saddam was using chemical weapons
     against Iranian troops. When Saddam bombed Kurdish rebels and
     civilians with a lethal cocktail of mustard gas, sarin, tabun
     and VX in 1988, the Reagan administration first blamed Iran,
     before acknowledging, under pressure from congressional
     Democrats, that the culprits were Saddam's own forces. There
     was only token official protest at the time. Saddam's men
     were unfazed. An Iraqi audiotape, later captured by the
     Kurds, records Saddam's cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid (known as
     Ali Chemical) talking to his fellow officers about gassing
     the Kurds. "Who is going to say anything?" he asks. "The
     international community? F--k them!"
       The United States was much more concerned with protecting
     Iraqi oil from attacks by Iran as it was shipped through the
     Persian Gulf. In 1987, an Iraqi Exocet missile hit an
     American destroyer, the USS Stark, in the Persian Gulf,
     killing 37 crewmen. Incredibly, the United States excused
     Iraq for making an unintentional mistake and instead used the
     incident to accuse Iran of escalating the war in the gulf.
     The American tilt to Iraq became more pronounced. U.S.
     commandos began blowing up Iranian oil platforms and
     attacking Iranian patrol boats. In 1988, an American warship
     in the gulf accidentally shot down an Iranian Airbus, killing
     290 civilians. Within a few weeks, Iran, exhausted and
     fearing American intervention, gave up its war with Iraq.
       Saddam was feeling cocky. With the support of the West, he
     had defeated the Islamic revolutionaries in Iran. America
     favored him as a regional pillar; European and American
     corporations were vying for contracts with Iraq. He was
     visited by congressional delegations led by Sens. Bob Dole of
     Kansas and Alan Simpson of Wyoming, who were eager to promote
     American farm and business interests. But Saddam's
     megalomania was on the rise, and he overplayed his hand. In
     1990, a U.S. Customs sting operation snared several Iraqi
     agents who were trying to buy

[[Page S8993]]

     electronic equipment used to make triggers for nuclear bombs.
     Not long after, Saddam gained the world's attention by
     threatening "to burn Israel to the ground." At the
     Pentagon, analysts began to warn that Saddam was a growing
     menace, especially after he tried to buy some American-made
     high-tech furnaces useful for making nuclear-bomb parts. Yet
     other officials in Congress and in the Bush administration
     continued to see him as a useful, if distasteful, regional
     strongman. The State Department was equivocating with Saddam
     right up to the moment he invaded Kuwait in August 1990.


                     ambivalent about saddam's fate

       Some American diplomats suggest that Saddam might have
     gotten away with invading Kuwait if he had not been quite so
     greedy. "If he had pulled back to the Mutla Ridge
     [overlooking Kuwait City], he'd still be there today," one
     ex-ambassador told Newsweek. And even though President George
     H.W. Bush compared Saddam to Hitler and sent a half-million-
     man Army to drive him from Kuwait, Washington remained
     ambivalent about Saddam's fate. It was widely assumed by
     policymakers that Saddam would collapse after his defeat in
     Desert Storm, done in by him humiliated officer corps or
     overthrown by the revolt of a restive minority population.
     But Washington did not want to push very hard to topple
     Saddam. The gulf war, Bush I administration officials pointed
     out, had been fought to liberate Kuwait, not oust Saddam. "I
     am certain that had we taken all of Iraq, we would have been
     like the dinosaur in the tar pit--we would still be there,"
     wrote the American commander in Desert Storm, Gen. Norman
     Schwarzkopf, in his memoirs. America's allies in the region,
     most prominently Saudi Arabia, feared that a post-Saddam Iraq
     would splinter and destabilize the region. The Shiites in the
     south might bond with their fellow religionists in Iran,
     strengthening the Shiite mullahs, and threatening the Saudi
     border. In the north, the Kurds were agitating to break off
     parts of Iraq and Turkey to create a Kurdistan. So Saddam was
     allowed to keep his tanks and helicopters--which he used to
     crush both Shiite and Kurdish rebellions.
       The Bush administration played down Saddam's darkness after
     the gulf war. Pentagon bureaucrats compiled dossiers to
     support a war-crimes prosecution of Saddam, especially for
     his sordid treatment of POWs. They documented police stations
     and "sports facilities" where Saddam's henchmen used acid
     baths and electric drills on their victims. One document
     suggested that torture should be "artistic." But top
     Defense Department officials stamped the report secret. One
     Bush administration official subsequently told The Washington
     Post, "Some people were concerned that if we released it
     during the [1992 presidential] campaign, people would say,
     `Why don't you bring this guy to justice?' " (Defense
     Department aides say politics played no part in the report.)
       The Clinton administration was no more aggressive toward
     Saddam. In 1993, Saddam apparently hired some Kuwaiti liquor
     smugglers to try to assassinate former president Bush as he
     took a victory lap through the region. According to one
     former U.S. ambassador, the new administration was less than
     eager to see an open-and-shut case against Saddam, for fear
     that it would demand aggressive retaliation. When American
     intelligence continued to point to Saddam's role, the
     Clintonites lobbed a few cruise missiles into Baghdad. The
     attack reportedly killed one of Saddam's mistresses, but left
     the dictator defiant.


                       clinton-era covert actions

       The American intelligence community, under orders from
     President Bill Clinton, did mount covert actions aimed at
     toppling Saddam in the 1990s, but by most accounts they were
     badly organized and halfhearted. In the north, CIA operatives
     supported a Kurdish rebellion against Saddam in 1995.
     According to the CIA's man on the scene, former case officer
     Robert Baer, Clinton administration officials back in
     Washington "pulled the plug" on the operation just as it
     was gathering momentum. The reasons have long remained murky,
     but according to Baer, Washington was never sure that
     Saddam's successor would be an improvement, or that Iraq
     wouldn't simply collapse into chaos. "The question we could
     never answer," Baer told Newsweek, "was, `After Saddam
     goes, then what?' " A coup attempt by Iraqi Army officers
     fizzled the next year. Saddam brutally rolled up the
     plotters. The CIA operatives pulled out, rescuing everyone
     they could, and sending them to Guam.
       Meanwhile, Saddam was playing cat-and-mouse with weapons of
     mass destruction. As part of the settlement imposed by
     America and its allies at the end of the gulf war, Saddam was
     supposed to get rid of his existing stockpiles of chem-bio
     weapons, and to allow in inspectors to make sure none were
     being hidden or secretly manufactured. The U.N. inspectors
     did shut down his efforts to build a nuclear weapon. But
     Saddam continued to secretly work on his germ- and chemical-
     warfare program. When the inspectors first suspected what
     Saddam was trying to hide in 1995, Saddam's son-in-law,
     Hussein Kamel, suddenly fled Iraq to Jordan. Kamel had
     overseen Saddam's chem-bio program, and his defection forced
     the revelation of some of the secret locations of Saddam's
     deadly labs. That evidence is the heart of the "white
     paper" used last week by President Bush to support his
     argument that Iraq has been defying U.N. resolutions for the
     past decade. (Kamel had the bad judgment to return to Iraq,
     where he was promptly executed, along with various family
     members.)
       By now aware of the scale of Saddam's efforts to deceive,
     the U.N. arms inspectors were unable to certify that Saddam
     was no longer making weapons of mass destruction. Without
     this guarantee, the United Nations was unwilling to lift the
     economic sanctions imposed after the gulf war. Saddam
     continued to play "cheat and retreat" with--the inspectors,
     forcing a showdown in December 1998. The United Nations
     pulled out its inspectors, and the United States and Britain
     launched Operation Desert Fox, four days of bombing that was
     supposed to teach Saddam a lesson and force his compliance.
       Saddam thumbed his nose. The United States and its allies,
     in effect, shrugged and walked away. While the U.N. sanctions
     regime gradually eroded, allowing Saddam to trade easily
     on the black market, he was free to brew all the chem-bio
     weapons he wanted. Making a nuclear weapon is harder, and
     intelligence officials still believe he is a few years
     away from even regaining the capacity to manufacture
     enriched uranium to build his own bomb. If he can steal or
     buy ready-made fissile material, say from the Russian
     mafia, he could probably make a nuclear weapon in a matter
     of months, though it would be so large that delivery would
     pose a challenge.


                              lashing out?

       As the Bush administration prepares to oust Saddam, one way
     or another, senior administration officials are very worried
     that Saddam will try to use his WMD arsenal Intelligence
     experts have warned that Saddam may be "flushing" his
     small, easy-to-conceal biological agents, trying to get them
     out of the country before an American invasion. A vial of
     bugs or toxins that could kill thousands could fit in a
     suitcase--or a diplomatic pouch. There are any number of grim
     end-game scenarios. Saddam could try blackmail, threatening
     to unleash smallpox or some other grotesque virus in an
     American city if U.S. forces invaded. Or, like a cornered
     dog, he could lash out in a final spasm of violence, raining
     chemical weapons down on U.S. troops, handing out his
     bioweapons to terrorists. "That's the single biggest worry
     in all this," says a senior administration official. "We
     are spending a lot of time on this," said another top
     official.
       Some administration critics have said, in effect, let
     sleeping dogs lie. Don't provoke Saddam by threatening his
     life; there is no evidence that he has the capability to
     deliver weapons of mass destruction. Countered White House
     national-security adviser Condoleezza Rice, "Do we wait
     until he's better at it?" Several administration officials
     indicated that an intense effort is underway, covert as well
     as overt, to warn Saddam's lieutenants to save themselves by
     breaking from the dictator before it's too late. "Don't be
     the fool who follows the last order" is the way one senior
     administration official puts it.
       The risk is that some will choose to go down with Saddam,
     knowing that they stand to be hanged by an angry mob after
     the dictator falls. It is unclear what kind of justice would
     follow his fall, aside from summary hangings from the nearest
     lamppost.


                            post-saddam iraq

       The Bush administration is determined not to "overthrow
     one strongman only to install another," a senior
     administration official told Newsweek. This official said
     that the president has made clear that he wants to press for
     democratic institutions, government accountability and the
     rule of law in post-Saddam Iraq. But no one really knows how
     that can be achieved. Bush's advisers are counting on the
     Iraqis themselves to resist a return to despotism. "People
     subject to horrible tryanny have strong antibodies to anyone
     who wants to put them back under tyranny," says a senior
     administration official. But as another official
     acknowledged, "a substantial American commitment" to Iraq
     is inevitable.
       At what cost? And who pays? Will other nations chip in
     money and men? It is not clear how many occupation troops
     will be required to maintain order, or for how long. Much
     depends on the manner of Saddam's exit: whether the Iraqis
     drive him out themselves, or rely heavily on U.S. power.
     Administration officials shy away from timeables and
     specifies but say they have to be prepared for all
     contingencies. "As General Eisenhower said, `Every plan gets
     thrown out on the first day of battle. Plans are useless.
     Planning is everything'," said Vice President Cheney's chief
     of staff, I, Lewis (Scooter) Libby.
       It is far from clear that America will be able to control
     the next leader of Iraq, even if he is not as diabolical as
     Saddam. Any leader of Iraq will look around him and see that
     Israel and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and that Iran may
     soon. Just as England and France opted to build their own
     bombs in the cold war, and not depend on the U.S. nuclear
     umbrella, the next president of Iraq may want to have his own
     bomb. "He may want to, but he can't be allowed to," says a
     Bush official. But what is to guarantee that a newly rich
     Iraqi strongman won't buy one with his nation's vast oil
     wealth? In some ways, Iraq is to the Middle East as Germany
     was to Europe in the 20th century, too large, too
     militaristic and too competent to coexit peacebly with
     neighbors. It took two world wars and millions of lives to
     solve "the German problem." Getting rid of Saddam may be
     essential to creating a stable, democratic

[[Page S8994]]

     Iraq. But it may be only a first step on a long and dangerous
     march.
                                  ____

       Per our previous conversation, after reviewing the
     available licensing records of the Bureau of Export
     Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, related to
     biological materials exported to the government of Iraq,
     additional information identifying the genus species, and
     strain or origin (if known) of the following viruses,
     bacteria, fungi, and protozoa for which export licenses were
     granted is requested.
     Date License Approved, Consignee, and Material information:
     02/08/85, Iraq Atomic Energy Commission, Ustilago
     02/22/85 (2 each), Ministry of Higher Education, Fungi
         Histoplasma
     07/11/85 (2 each), Middle and Near East Regional A, Fungi
         Histoplasma
     10/02/85 (46 each), Ministry of Higher Education, Bacteria
     10/08/85 (10 each), Ministry of Higher Education, Bacteria,
         Clostridium, Francisella
     03/21/86 (18 each), Agriculture and Water Resources, Fungi,
         Alysidium, Aspergillus, Hypopichia
     03/21/86 (21 each), Agriculture and Water Resources, Fungi,
         Actinormucor, Aspergillus, Rhizopus, Rhizomucor,
         Talaromyces, Fusarium, Penicillium, Tricyoderma
     02/04/87 (11 each), State Company for Drug Indust, Bacteria
         Bacillus, Bacillus, Escherichia, Staphylococcus,
         Klebsiella, Salmonella, Pseudomonas
     08/17/87 (2 each), Iraq Atomic Energy Commission, Bacteria,
         Escherichia
     03/24/88 (3 each), Iraq Atomic Energy Commission, Bacteria,
         Escherichia
     04/22/88, Sera and Vaccine Institute, Bacteria, Salmonella
         (Class I), Clostridium (Class II), Brucella (Class III),
         Corynebacterium (II), Vibrio (Class III)
     05/05/88 (1 each), Iraq Atomic Energy Commission, Bacteria,
         Escherichia
     08/16/88, Ministry of Trade, Bacteria, (12 each) Bacillus
         (Class III), (6 each) Bacillus (Class II), (6 each)
         Bacillus (Class III), (9 each) Clostridium (Class 10)
     11/07/88 (2 each), Iraq Atomic Energy Commission, Bacteria,
         Escherichia (Class I)
     12/19/88 (3 each), Iraq Atomic Energy Commission, Bacteria
         Escherichia (Class I)

       The above listing includes only those material for which
     export licenses were granted from January 1, 1985, until the
     present. A number of requests were returned without action.
     If any information is available as to the specific materials
     requested by