I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY: INTERESTS AND GOALS.
The bitter struggle that divided the world for over two generations has
come to an end. The collapse of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe means
that the Cold War is over, its core issue resolved. We have entered a new
era, one whose outline would have been unimaginable only three years ago.
This new era offers great hope, but this hope must be tempered by the
even greater uncertainty we face. Almost immediately new crises and
instabilities came upon us. The Gulf War was a forceful reminder that
there are still autonomous sources of turbulence in the world. In the
Soviet Union, while we have seen a healthy retrenchment in foreign policy,
we also see a continuing internal crisis, with a danger of violence
overhanging the hopes for internal reform. We face new challenges not only
to our security, but to our ways of thinking about security.
For over 40 years, the American grand strategy of containment has
reflected an era of expanding Soviet power, Soviet aggression and Soviet
Communism. We now find, however, that the Soviet Union is far more
inwardly focused as it wrestles with its internal crises. We do not know
what path the Soviet Union will ultimately take, but a return to the same
superpower adversary we have faced for over 40 years is unlikely.
That said, the Soviet Union remains the only state possessing the
physical military capability to destroy American society with a single,
cataclysmic attack and, in spite of severe economic strains, the
modernization of Soviet strategic forces continues virtually across the
board. Even with a START Treaty, the Soviets will retain more than 6,000
strategic weapons. The Soviets will also -- despite the heartening
reductions we have seen in their conventional capabilities -- retain some
three million men in their armed forces. These enduring realities cannot
Shaping a security strategy for a new era will require an understanding
of the extraordinary trends at work today -- a clear picture of what has
changed and what has not, an accurate sense of the opportunities that
history has put before us and a sober appreciation of the dangers that
Politically, a key issue is how America's role of alliance leader --
and indeed our alliances themselves -- will be affected, especially in
Europe, by a reduced Soviet threat. The positive common basis of our
alliances -- the defense of democratic values -- must be reaffirmed and
strengthened. Yet, differences among allies are likely to become more
evident as the traditional concern for security that first brought them
together diminishes in intensity. We need to consider how the United
States and its allies can best respond to a new agenda of political
challenges -- such as the troubled evolution of the Soviet Union or the
volatile Middle East -- in the framework of the moral and political values
we continue to share.
In the realm of military strategy, we confront dangers more ambiguous
than those we previously faced. What type and distribution of forces are
needed to combat not a particular, poised enemy but the nascent threats of
power vacuums and regional instabilities? How do we reduce our
conventional capabilities in ways that ensure we could rebuild them faster
than an enemy could build a devastating new threat against us? How does
the proliferation of advanced weaponry affect our traditional problem of
deterrence? How should we think about these new military challenges and
what capabilities and forces should we develop to secure ourselves against
America will continue to support an international economic system as
open and inclusive as possible, as the best way to strengthen global
economic development, political stability and the growth of free
societies. But how can these goals best be attained, especially if they
are not completely shared by all of our economic competitors? How will the
end of the Cold War and the increased economic strength of our major
trading partners influence economic, political and even security
relationships? In addition to working actively to conclude successfully
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, what other market-
opening objectives should the United States pursue, and with whom should
we pursue them?
In the emerging post-Cold War world, international relations promise to
be more complicated, more volatile and less predictable. Indeed, of all
the mistakes that could be made about the security challenges of a new
era, the most dangerous would be to believe that suddenly the future can
be predicted with certainty. The history of the 20th century has been
replete with surprises, many unwelcome.
In many ways, if there is a historical analogy for today's strategic
environment, it is less the late 1940s than it is the 1920s. In the 1920s,
judging that the great threat to our interests had collapsed and that no
comparable threat was evident, the Nation turned inward. That course had
near disastrous consequences then and it would be even more dangerous now.
At a time when the world is far more interdependent -- economically,
technologically, environmentally -- any attempt to isolate ourselves
militarily and politically would be folly.
Despite the emergence of new power centers, the United States remains
the only state with truly global strength, reach and influence in every
dimension -- political, economic and military. In these circumstances, our
natural desire to share burdens more equitably with newly-strong friends
does not relieve us of our own responsibilities.
America's role is rooted not only in power, but also in trust. When, in
the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait, the Saudis invited foreign forces
onto their soil, King Fahd observed:
I trust the United States of America. I know that when you say you will
be committed, you are, in fact,
tted. I know that you will stay as long as
sary to do what has to be done, and I know you
leave when you are asked to leave at the end, and that you have no
We cannot be the world's policeman with responsibility for solving all
the world's security problems. But we remain the country to whom others
turn when in distress. This faith in us creates burdens, certainly, and in
the Gulf we showed that American leadership must include mobilizing the
world community to share the danger and risk. But the failure of others to
bear their burden would not excuse us. In the end, we are answerable to
our own interests and our own conscience -- to our ideals and to history
-- for what we do with the power we have. In the 1990s, as for much of
this century, there is no substitute for American leadership. Our
responsibility, even in a new era, is pivotal and inescapable.
The Gulf crisis interrupted a time of hope. We saw a new world coming,
a world freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of
justice, more secure in the quest for peace. Democracy was gaining ground
as were the principles of human rights and political and economic freedom.
This new world is still within reach, perhaps brought closer by the
unprecedented international cooperation achieved in the Gulf crisis.
But even after such a success, we face not only the complex security
issues outlined above, but a new agenda of new kinds of security issues.
Our national power, for example, ultimately rests on the strength and
resilience of our economy, and our security would be badly served if we
allowed fiscal irresponsibility at home to erode our ability to protect
our interests abroad, to aid new democracies or to help find solutions to
other global problems. The scourge of illegal drugs saps our vitality as a
free people, diverts our energies from more positive pursuits and
threatens friendly democratic governments now plagued by drug traffickers.
The environmental depredations of Saddam Hussein have underscored that
protecting the global ecology is a top priority on the agenda of
international cooperation -- from extinguishing oil fires in Kuwait to
preserving the rain forests to solving water disputes to assessing climate
change. The upheavals of this era are also giving rise to human migrations
on an unprecedented scale, raising a host of social, economic, political
and moral challenges to the world's nations.
A security strategy that takes the Republic safely into the next
century will tend to these as well as to more traditional threats to our
safety and well-being.
OUR INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE 1990s
We need, then, an approach to security broad enough to preserve the
basic sources of our national strength and focused enough to deal with the
very real threats that still exist. Such an approach begins with an
understanding of our basic interests and objectives, interests and
objectives that even in a new era are enduring:
The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation,
with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
The United States seeks, whenever possible in concert with its allies,
-- deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United
States and its allies and -- should deterrence fail -- repel or defeat
military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States,
its interests and its allies;
-- effectively counter threats to the security of the United States and
its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat
of international terrorism;
-- improve stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control
agreements, modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing systems
capable of defending against limited ballistic-missile strikes, and
enhancing appropriate conventional capabilities;
-- promote democratic change in the Soviet Union, while maintaining
firm policies that discourage any temptation to new quests for military
-- foster restraint in global military spending and discourage military
-- prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologies and
resources to hostile countries or groups, especially the spread of
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and associated high-technology
means of delivery; and
-- reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by
encouraging reduction in foreign production, combatting international
traffickers and reducing demand at home.
A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual
prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.
National security and economic strength are indivisible. We seek to:
-- promote a strong, prosperous and competitive U.S. economy;
-- ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the
oceans and space;
-- promote an open and expanding international economic system, based
on market principles, with minimal distortions to trade and investment,
stable currencies, and broadly respected rules for managing and resolving
economic disputes; and
-- achieve cooperative international solutions to key environmental
challenges, assuring the sustainability and environmental security of the
planet as well as growth and opportunity for all.
healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and
To build and sustain such relationships, we seek to:
-- strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a
commitment to democracy and individual rights;
-- establish a more balanced partnership with our allies and a greater
sharing of global leadership and responsibilities;
-- strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to
make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political,
economic and social progress;
-- support Western Europe's historic march toward greater economic and
political unity, including a European security identity within the
Atlantic Alliance, and nurture a closer relationship between the United
States and the European Community; and
-- work with our North Atlantic allies to help develop the processes of
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to bring about
reconciliation, security and democracy in a Europe whole and free.
A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human
rights and democratic institutions flourish.
Our interests are best served in a world in which democracy and its
ideals are widespread and secure. We seek to:
-- maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers
that might seek regional dominance;
-- promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes;
-- promote the growth of free, democratic political institutions as the
surest guarantors of both human rights and economic and social progress;
-- aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from
aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug
-- support aid, trade and investment policies that promote economic
development and social and political progress.
II. TRENDS IN THE WORLD TODAY: NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND CONCERNS
Despite the uncertainties that remain, we see a fundamental
transformation of the global strategic environment in several areas. Our
policies and strategy for the decade ahead must be designed to adapt to
these changes, and to shape them in ways that benefit the United States
and its friends and allies.
The Soviet Future
If Central and Eastern Europe was the scene of the peaceful Revolution
of 1989, the dramatic story of 1991 is the deepening crisis within the
Soviet Union. The old system of Communist orthodoxy is discredited, yet
its die-hard adherents have not given up the struggle against change.
Fundamental choices -- of multi-party democracy, national
self-determination and market economic reform -- have been postponed too
long. The economy is deteriorating. The painful process of establishing
new, legitimate political and economic institutions has much farther to
If reform is to succeed, Soviet leaders must move decisively to effect
institutional change. When invited and where appropriate, we will offer
our cooperation. But it is clearly not in our interest to offer assistance
in a way that allows the Soviet government to avoid the hard choices that
in the longer run are the only hope for the people of that country. At the
July 1991 London Economic Summit, the participants announced their support
for special associate status for the Soviet Union in the IMF and World
Bank. This will give the Soviets access to the technical advice they need
to formulate and implement their reform program.
The processes of reform inside the Soviet Union have already had a
revolutionary impact on Soviet foreign policy. With former ideological
imperatives giving way to a new pragmatism, areas of cooperation have
expanded. The end of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe was a
transforming event. Soviet policy toward the unification of Germany was
constructive. The reduced role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy has
diminished the importance of many developing areas as arenas of conflict
with the West. Soviet support in the UN Security Council for the
resolutions against Iraqi aggression was an important contribution to the
international effort. We are hopeful that such cooperation can be
expanded. Of course, the Soviets would pay a severe political price for
any return to practices of an earlier era, exploiting regional disputes
and instabilities for their presumed advantage.
Today, the threat of a U.S.-Soviet military conflict is lower than at
any time since the end of World War 11. With the ongoing withdrawal of
Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, the unilateral reductions now underway
and the recently signed CFE treaty (if faithfully implemented), the threat
of a sudden, massive offensive against NATO will have been eliminated.
Despite uncertainty over the Soviet internal evolution, any attempt by the
Soviets to resolve such a threat would require lengthy preparation and be
enormously costly and virtually impossible to conceal. Moreover, the START
Treaty signed at the Moscow Summit will significantly reduce US and Soviet
strategic nuclear arsenals.
But Soviet military power is hardly becoming irrelevant. The Soviet
Union is and will remain a military super-power. Beyond its modernized
strategic arsenal, the Soviet Union's conventional forces west of the
Urals will dwarf any other national force in Europe. While they no longer
pose the threat of a short-warning, theater-wide offensive, they could
still pose a potent threat to a single flank or region. The size and
orientation of Soviet military forces must therefore remain critical
concerns to the United States and the overall health of the European
system will still require a counterweight to Soviet military strength.
It is our responsibility as a government to hedge against the
uncertainties of the future. Elements of the U.S.- Soviet relationship
will remain competitive, and there is always the danger that
confrontations will re-emerge. Our evolving relationship is also not
immune to Soviet attempts to lay the problems created by decades of
domestic tyranny, misrule and mismanagement at the feet of "foreign
enemies". Nor is it immune to the implications of the forceful repression
of democratic forces, slowing the Soviet Union's progress on a road that
must be taken if it is to successfully meet the challenges before it. The
internal order of a state is ultimately reflected in its external
behavior. We will remain alert to the potential strategic consequences of
a return to totalitarian policies.
The Growing Roles of Germany and Japan
One of the most important and far-reaching strategic developments of a
new era and a major success of America's postwar policy -- is the
emergence of Japan and Germany as economic and political leaders. The
United States has long encouraged such a development, and our close ties
with these democracies have created the climate of reassurance necessary
for their evolution as stable and powerful countries enjoying good
relations with their neighbors. As these countries assume a greater
political role, the health of American ties with them -- political,
military and economic -- will remain crucial to regional and even global
stability. These links are not relics of an earlier period. They are all
the more needed in a new era as these countries' roles expand.
But we frequently find ourselves competitors -- sometimes even bitter
competitors -- in the economic arena. These frictions must be managed if
we are to preserve the partnerships that have fostered reconciliation,
reassurance, democracy and security in the postwar period. In this sense,
ongoing trade negotiations now share some of the strategic importance we
have traditionally attached to arms talks with the Soviet Union.
The Gulf crisis has also reopened, with a new sense of urgency, the
question of responsibility-sharing -- not only with respect to sharing the
costs and risks of Gulf operations, but also with regard to sharing the
costs of U.S. forces defending Europe and Japan. Our allies are doing
more, as befits their economic strength, but the issue may grow more acute
as we and they adjust to a new era.
The New Europe
It is Europe more than any other area that has held the key to the
global balance in this century, and it is this continent more than any
other that is experiencing fundamental change. The unification of Germany
last October quickened the pace to a new, more promising era and a
continent truly whole and free. As Europe is being transformed
politically, we are also lifting the military shadows and fears with which
we have lived for nearly half a century.
All across the Continent, the barriers that once confined people and
ideas are collapsing. East Europeans are determining their own destinies,
choosing freedom and economic liberty. One by one, the states of Central
and Eastern Europe have begun to reclaim the European cultural and
political tradition that is their heritage. All Soviet forces are gone
from Czechoslovakia and Hungary and withdrawals from Germany and Poland
are underway. The military capability of the Soviet forces still remaining
in Eastern Europe is rapidly diminishing and the Warsaw Pact has been
Basic to the new structure of peace we seek to build throughout Europe
is the continued vitality of the North Atlantic Alliance -- the
indispensable foundation of transatlantic cooperation. To keep the
Alliance strong and viable in a new environment we must recognize that
there are important tasks beyond the changed -- but still important --
requirement to balance and deter Soviet military power. NATO must deter
and defend against the threat of aggression from any state against the
territory of a NATO member. NATO will also be essential in promoting a
stable security environment throughout Europe, an environment based on
democratic institutions and the peaceful resolution of disputes, an
environment free of intimidation or attempts at hegemony. Finally, NATO
still serves as an indispensable transatlantic forum for consultations on
issues that affect common political and security interests. As the
European Community heads toward the new milestone of a single market by
the end of 1992, we enter a revolution of relations in the West, perhaps
ultimately as important strategically as the revolution taking place in
the East. It is no accident that Europeans are contemplating greater West
European cohesion in the security field, even while preserving the vital
transatlantic framework. We will work to adapt NATO's structures to
encompass European desires for a distinct security identity within the
Alliance and we will encourage greater European responsibility for
Europe's defense. While European governments will naturally take the lead
in developing their own institutions, these efforts will enjoy our full
support as long as they strengthen the Alliance. We will also work to
adapt Alliance command structures to new realities -- the reassessment of
risks, a new NATO strategy, a different force structure -- in ways that
sustain the unique contribution of NATO's integrated military command.
The continued freedom, vitality and national independence of the new
Eastern European democracies are also critical to the new structure of
peace we seek to build throughout Europe. Any reversal of the present
positive trend in Soviet policy would have serious implications. As the
North Atlantic allies declared in June: "Our own security is inseparably
linked to that of all other states in Europe. The consolidation and
preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their
freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct
and material concern to us." We and our NATO allies have established a
program of contacts with the militaries of these states to support
military establishments that will sustain newly won freedoms and we have
extended our bilateral International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program to strengthen military professionalism and to promote the
principle of civilian oversight of the armed forces.
It is important that we not let euphoria over the easing of East-West
confrontation blind us to the potential security problems within a new
Europe. Historical enmities in Western Europe have been largely consigned
to the past but disputes between and among some Eastern European states
and ethnic groups appear to have been merely frozen in time by decades of
Cold War. In the interwar period, the politics of these states were often
dominated by economic hardship, competing nationalisms and overlapping
territorial claims. We have reason to be more hopeful today, but security
problems could emerge in the East in the course of the 1990s. The powerful
centrifugal forces in Yugoslavia are particularly worrisome.
The overall structure of peace in Europe must be made solid enough to
withstand the turmoil that looms ahead. We need to develop the processes
and principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
and perhaps other mechanisms to ease ethnic and national tensions and to
dampen and resolve conflicts.
Europe also may be about to face a new problem, not new in kind, but in
scope: mass migrations and flows of refugees in response to the breakdown
of the communist world and the magnetic attraction of Western European
prosperity. From the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, from North Africa
and the Near East, we could see thousands fleeing economic hardship and
seeking a better life. For Western European countries, there could be
enormous economic, social and political strains -- an unprecedented
challenge to the new Europe, testing its moral and political character.
While Europe remains a central strategic arena, the Gulf crisis
reminded us how much our interests can be affected in other regions as
As the effects of the Cold War recede, regional disputes are less
likely automatically to be perceived as part of a permanent -- frequently
dangerous, sometimes violent -- global competition, thus allowing broader
international cooperation in their resolution.
Less happily, in some regions this overall positive trend could unleash
local, destructive forces that were formerly kept in check. As we saw in
the Gulf, there is the danger of locally dominant powers, armed with
modern weaponry and ancient ambitions, threatening the world's hope for a
new era of cooperation. We see regimes that have made themselves champions
of regional radicalism, states that are all too vulnerable to such
pressures, governments that refuse to recognize one another, and countries
that have claims on one another's territory -- some with significant
military capabilities and a history of recurring war. A key task for the
future will be maintaining regional balances and resolving such disputes
before they erupt in military conflict.
If the end of the Cold War lives up to its promise and liberates U.S.
policy from many of its earlier concerns, we should be able to concentrate
more on enhancing security -- in the developing world, particularly
through means that are more political, social and economic than military.
We must recognize the stark fact that our hopeful new era still has within
it dislocations and dangers that threaten the fragile shoots of democracy
and progress that have recently emerged. Malnutrition, illiteracy and
poverty put dangerous pressures on democratic institutions as hungry,
uneducated or poorly housed citizens are ripe for radicalization by
movements of the left and the right. Our response to need and turmoil must
increasingly emphasize the strengthening of democracy, and a long-term
investment in the development of human resources and the structures of
free markets and free governments. Such measures are an investment in our
own security as well as a response to the demands of simple justice.
The Western Hemisphere
Nowhere is this more true than in our own hemisphere, where our
fundamental aims are to deepen the sense of partnership and common
Latin Americans have long argued that U.S. interest has waxed and waned
with the rise and fall of extrahemispheric threats to regional security.
Our policy has sought to allay these fears, as it is founded on the
principle of a common destiny and mutual responsibility. The Western
Hemisphere is all the more significant to the United States in light of
today's global trends, political and economic.
The resurgence of democracy, the worldwide phenomenon that is such an
inspiration to us, is heading toward a dramatic achievement -- a
completely democratic hemisphere. This drive gained momentum last year
with the election of democratic governments in Nicaragua and Haiti, the
restoration of democracy in Panama, and several other democratic
elections. The electoral defeat of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua
is especially noteworthy as it has led to the end of Soviet and Cuban
military assistance, thereby increasing the security of all of Central
America. The United States has provided political and economic support for
the new government and its program for reconstruction and long-term
development. Despite these successes, we realize that democratic
institutions in much of Latin
East Asia and the Pacific
East Asia and the Pacific are home to some of the world's most
economically and politically dynamic societies. The region also includes
some of the last traditional Communist regimes on the face of the globe.
Regional hotspots tragically persist on the Korean peninsula and in
Cambodia, and there are territorial disputes in which progress is long
overdue, including the Soviet Union's continued occupation of Japan's
In this complex environment, an era of Soviet adventurism is on the
ebb, even while its effects linger. This is placing new stresses on
Vietnam, Cambodia and North Korea as Soviet military and economic aid
declines and Moscow seeks to improve relations with Seoul, Tokyo and other
capitals. China is coming to view its neighbors in a new light, and is
gradually adjusting to a changing perception of the Soviet threat.
Through a web of bilateral relationships, the United States has pursued
throughout the postwar period a policy of engagement in support of the
stability and security that are prerequisites to economic and political
progress. U.S. power remains welcome in key states in the region, who
recognize the pivotal role we continue to play in the regional balance. We
remain a key factor of reassurance and stability. By ensuring freedom of
the seas through naval and air strength and by offering these capabilities
as a counterweight in the region's power equations, we are likely to
remain welcome in an era of shifting patterns and possible as new
Today's basically healthy conditions cannot be taken for granted. We
will continue to be a beacon for democracy and human rights. We will meet
our responsibilities in the security field. We will also remain actively
engaged in promoting free and expanding markets through Asian Pacific
Economic Cooperation, recognizing that economic progress is a major
ingredient in Asia's political stability and democratic progress.
As noted earlier, our alliance with Japan remains of enormous strategic
importance. Our hope is to see the U.S.- Japan global partnership extend
beyond its traditional confines and into fields like refugee relief, non-
proliferation and the environment. On the Korean peninsula, we and the
Republic of Korea seek to persuade North Korea of the benefit of
confidence-building measures as a first step to lasting peace and
reunification. We firmly believe that true stability can only be achieved
through direct North- South talks. At the same time, the United States
remains committed to the security of the Republic of Korea as it continues
to open its economic and political systems. We are increasingly concerned
about North Korea's failure to observe its obligations under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and consider this to be the most pressing
security issue on the peninsula.
China, like the Soviet Union, poses a complex challenge as it proceeds
inexorably toward major systemic change. China's inward focus and struggle
to achieve stability will not preclude increasing interaction with its
neighbors as trade and technology advance. Consultations and contact with
China will be central features of our policy, lest we intensify the
isolation that shields repression. Change is inevitable in China, and our
links with China must endure.
The United States maintains strong, unofficial, substantive relations
with Taiwan where rapid economic and political change is underway. One of
our goals is to foster an environment in which Taiwan and the Peoples
Republic of China can pursue a constructive and peaceful interchange
across the Taiwan Strait.
In Southeast Asia, there is renewed hope for a settlement in Cambodia.
Only through resolution of the conflict in Cambodia can there be the
promise of our restoring normal relations with that beleaguered nation and
with Vietnam. Hanoi and Phnom Penh have sadly delayed the day when they
can enjoy normal ties with us or their Southeast Asian neighbors. Of
course, the pace and scope of our actions will also be directly affected
by steps that are taken to resolve the fate of Americans still unaccounted
for. The resolution of this issue remains one of our highest priorities.
Even with the loss of Clark Air Base, we remain committed to helping
the Philippines make a success of its new democracy and to fulfilling our
legitimate defense function there as allies and equals. In the South
Pacific, we are demonstrating renewed interest in and assistance for the
island states. Australia retains its special position as a steadfast ally
and key Pacific partner. We look forward to the day when New Zealand will
choose to resume its responsibilities to the ANZUS alliance and rejoin
Australia and the United States in this important regional structure.
The Middle East and South Asia
The reversal of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was a watershed event.
Nonetheless, our basic policy toward the region shows powerful continuity.
American strategic concerns still include promoting stability and the
security of our friends, maintaining a free flow of oil, curbing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles,
discouraging destabilizing conventional arms sales, countering terrorism
and encouraging a peace process that brings about reconciliation between
Israel and the Arab states as well as between Palestinians and Israel in a
manner consonant with our enduring commitment to Israel's security.
The regional environment since Desert Storm presents new challenges and
new opportunities. Even as we provide badly needed relief and protection
to refugees, we will work to bring about greater security and a lasting
-- We will help states in the Middle East to fashion
nal security arrangements that bolster deterrence
ncourage the peaceful resolution of disputes.
-- We will work with parties inside and outside the region to change
the destructive pattern of military competition and proliferation. This
will involve confidence-building and arms control measures as well as more
global forms of control over the supply of arms, especially weapons of
uction and the means to deliver them.
-- We will encourage economic reconstruction and recovery, using the
political and economic strengths of the victorious coalition to support
economic openness and cooperation. We will also encourage regional states
to evolve toward greater political participation and respect for human
-- We will continue the effort to bring about a comprehensive peace and
true reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states and between Israel
and the Palestinians.
-- We will continue to demand that Iraq comply fully and
unconditionally with all relevant UN resolutions, including Security
Council Resolution 687 and its stipulation that Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missile- related facilities be destroyed.
-- We remain open to an improved relationship with Iran. However,
meaningful improvement can only occur after Iran makes clear it is lending
no support to hostage-taking or other forms of terrorism.
-- We will also continue to monitor Libyan behavior, including
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and attempts to
destabilize neighboring governments.
In South Asia, as elsewhere, we strongly believe that security is best
served by resolving disputes through negotiations rather than military
pressure. The dangers of intermediate-range missile deployments and
nuclear proliferation in the sub-continent persist, however, and this year
we were unable to certify Pakistan's nuclear program under the Pressler
Amendment. We will continue to encourage Indo-Pakistani rapprochement and
the adoption of confidence-building measures and other concrete steps to
moderate their military competition. We also remain committed to achieving
a comprehensive political settlement in Afghanistan.
The end of the Cold war should benefit Africa in that it will no longer
be seen as a battleground for superpower conflict. In a world at peace,
more attention and resources should be freed to help the world's poorest.
Nonetheless, many Africans now fear that the outside world will lose
interest in their troubled continent, just at the moment when many
negative trends from economic decline to AIDS to environmental degradation
are likely to accelerate.
In a continent as diverse as Africa, democracy -- as it emerges,
reemerges, or begins its development -- may take different forms, and its
progress will be uneven. But we need not be inhibited in supporting values
that have proved universal -- political and human rights, democratic
limits on the powers of government, judicial independence, free press and
free speech. To those who think these goals are out of reach because of
Africa's poverty and disparate cultures, we say that democracy remains the
political system most open to cultural diversity and most conducive to
economic advance. Freedom, in its universal meaning, is Africa's
birthright as much as it is anyone else's.
In the economic realm, hope lies in reducing the burden of statism and
encouraging indigenous enterprise and human talent, especially in
agriculture. The most important steps are those that must be taken by
Africans themselves. Concepts of democracy and market economics must be
applied in a continent where initially these concepts were rejected
because socialism was fashionable. That failed experiment has now run its
course, and political elites across Africa are rediscovering basic truths
about political and economic freedom as the source of progress. We need to
support this growing realism, which recognizes the failures from the past
and which has produced pragmatic new leaders ready to move in new
directions. Benign neglect will not suffice.
Africa is not without its beacons of hope. The efforts of white and
black leaders in South Africa to move that country into a democratic,
constitutional, post-apartheid era merit our active support and we have
provided it. We have made clear our firm and enthusiastic support for the
brave endeavor on which they have embarked.
Elsewhere in Africa, we can be proud of the role we played in bringing
to an end civil wars in Angola and Ethiopia. We continue to play an active
role in helping to resolve other conflicts such as those in Liberia and
Africa is now entering an age in which it can benefit from past
mistakes and build a realistic, self-sustaining future. It is in our
interest, for political as well as humanitarian reasons, to help that
III. RELATING MEANS TO ENDS: A POLITICAL AGENDA FOR THE 1990S
ALLIANCES, COALITIONS AND A NEW UNITED NATIONS
Our first priority in foreign policy remains solidarity with our allies
and friends. The stable foundation of our security will continue to be a
common effort with peoples with whom we share fundamental moral and
political values and security interests. Those nations with whom we are
bound by alliances will continue to be our closest partners in building
a new world order.
As our response to the Gulf crisis demonstrated, our leadership in a
new era must also include a broader concept of international community and
international diplomacy. If tensions with the Soviet Union continue to
ease, we will face more ambiguous -- but still serious -- challenges. It
will be difficult to foresee where future crises will arise. In many cases
they will involve states not part of one or another bloc. Increasingly we
may find ourselves in situations in which our interests are congruent with
those of nations not tied to us by formal treaties. As in the Gulf, we may
be acting in hybrid coalitions that include not only traditional allies
but also nations with whom we do not have a mature history of diplomatic
and military cooperation or, indeed, even a common political or moral
outlook. This will require flexibility in our diplomacy and military
policy, without losing sight of the fundamental values which that
diplomacy and policy are designed to protect and on which they are based.
To this end, we are well served to strengthen the role of international
organizations like the United Nations.
For over 40 years political differences, bloc politics and demagogic
rhetoric have kept the UN from reaching the full potential envisioned by
its founders. Now we see the UN beginning to act as it was designed, freed
from the superpower antagonisms that often frustrated consensus, less
hobbled by the ritualistic anti-Americanism that so often weakened its
The response of the UN to Iraq's unprovoked aggression against a member
state has truly vindicated and rejuvenated the institution. But even
before that, the UN had distinguished itself in fostering democratic
change in Namibia and Nicaragua. In the near future, we hope to see it
play a constructive role in Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Western Sahara, El
Salvador and elsewhere, assisting with elections and the return of
displaced persons, as well as with peace-keeping.
The role of the UN in improving the human condition and ameliorating
human suffering -- development, aid to refugees, education, disaster
relief -- will continue to attract our leadership and resources. High on
our agenda for international cooperation are the global challenges posed
by illegal drugs, terrorism and degradation of the environment.
The costs of a world organization that can effectively carry out these
missions are already significant and will increase as new tasks are
undertaken. We have re-stated our intention to pay in full our annual
assessments and are now paying arrearages. We intend to complete
arrearages payments no later than 1995 and to pay our share of any new
peacekeeping requirements. In voluntary funding, we will pay our fair
share and encourage others to do the same.
THE CONTEST OF IDEAS AND THE NURTURING OF DEMOCRACY
Recent history has shown how much ideas count. The Cold War was, in its
decisive aspect, a war of ideas. But ideas count only when knowledge
spreads. In today's evolving political environment, and in the face of the
global explosion of information, we must make clear to our friends and
potential adversaries what we stand for.
The need for international understanding among different peoples,
cultures, religions and forms of government will only grow. In a world
without the clear-cut East-West divisions of the past, the flow of ideas
and information will take on larger significance as once-isolated
countries seek their way toward the international mainstream. Indeed,
information access has already achieved global proportions. A truly global
community is being formed, vindicating our democratic values.
Through broadcasts, academic and cultural exchanges, press briefings,
publications, speakers and conferences, we engage those abroad in a
dialogue about who and what we are -- to inform foreign audiences about
our policies, democratic traditions, pluralistic society and rich academic
and cultural diversity. We will increase our efforts to clarify what
America has to contribute to the solution of global problems -- and to
drive home democracy's place in this process.
ARMS CONTROL Arms control is an important component of a balanced
strategy to ameliorate the deadly consequences of global tensions as well
as to reduce their fundamental causes. Our goal remains agreements that
will enhance the security of the United States and its allies while
strengthening international stability by:
-- reducing military capabilities that could provide incentives to
-- enhancing predictability in the size and structure of forces in
order to reduce the fear of aggressive intent;
-- ensuring confidence in compliance, through effective verification.
Our pursuit of these goals has profited from the recent, positive
changes in East-West relations. With renewed commitment to conscientious
implementation and the resolution of remaining issues, we are within reach
of completing an arms control agenda that few imagined possible.
Much has already been accomplished. Within the past year we and the
Soviets have agreed to cease production of chemical weapons and to
destroy, using safe and environmentally- sound procedures, the vast
majority of our chemical weapons stocks. We have agreed to new protocols
to treaties on limiting underground nuclear weapons tests and nuclear
explosions for peaceful purposes, incorporating unprecedented on-site
verification of compliance with the limits set by the treaties. At the
Paris Summit last November, the United States, the Soviet Union and the
other nations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
endorsed new measures to promote transparency in military dispositions and
Also in Paris, the United States, our North Atlantic allies, the states
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), a historic agreement that will establish
numerical parity in major conventional armaments between East and West
from the Atlantic to the Urals. The treaty will require thousands of
weapons to be destroyed and includes unprecedented monitoring provisions.
Submitting the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification was delayed by Soviet claims made after the treaty was signed
-- that some of its ground force equipment held by units like naval
infantry and coastal defense was not covered by the agreement. The
satisfactory resolution of this question has opened the way for us to move
Soviet behavior on CFE complicated the completion of a Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty. However, during the London Economic Summit, Presidents
Bush and Gorbachev were able to overcome the last few obstacles on START,
ending nine long years of difficult, technical negotiations. Signed in
Moscow, this agreement will mark a fundamental milestone in reducing the
risk of nuclear war-stabilizing the balance of strategic forces at lower
levels, providing for significant reductions in the most threatening
weapons and encouraging a shift toward strategic systems better suited for
retaliation than for a first strike.
Our efforts to improve strategic stability will not stop here. We and
the Soviets have pledged further efforts to enhance strategic stability
and reduce the risk of nuclear war. We will seek agreements that improve
survivability, remove incentives for a nuclear first strike and implement
an appropriate relationship between strategic offenses and defenses. In
particular, we will pursue Soviet agreement to permit the deployment of
defenses designed to address the threat of limited ballistic missile
strikes, a growing mutual concern. We are also consulting with our NATO
allies on the framework that will guide the United States in future
discussions with the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear
forces in Europe.
The United States has long supported international agreements designed
to promote openness and freedom of navigation on the high seas. Over the
past year, however, the Soviet Union has intensified efforts to restrict
naval forces in ways contrary to internationally recognized rights of
access. We will continue to reject such proposals. As a maritime nation,
with our dependence on the sea to preserve legitimate security and
commercial ties, freedom of the seas is and will remain a vital interest.
We will not agree to measures that would limit the ability of our Navy to
protect that interest, nor will we permit a false equation to be drawn
between our Navy and regional ground-force imbalances that are inherently
destabilizing. Recent events in the Gulf, Liberia, Somalia and elsewhere
show that American seapower, without arbitrary limits on its force
structure or operations, makes a strong contribution to global stability
and mutual security.
As we put the main elements of European and East-West arms control into
place, attention will increasingly turn to other regional and global arms
control objectives. None is more urgent than stopping the global
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as the
missiles to deliver them.
The Gulf crisis drove home several lessons about this challenge:
-- International agreements, while essential, cannot cope with the
problem alone. Iraq is a party to both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the
1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Notwithstanding its treaty
obligations, Iraq has used chemical weapons and pursued nuclear ambitions.
-- Export controls must be strengthened. Chemical weapons facilities in
Libya and Iraq received technology and equipment from Western companies.
Iraq used the deadly product of its facilities against its own people.
Iraqi and several other nations' nuclear efforts and missile programs have
also benefited from outside assistance.
-- A successful non-proliferation strategy must address the underlying
security concerns that drive the quest to obtain advanced weapons and must
encompass contingency planning to deal with these weapons should
We are pursuing a three-tiered non-proliferation strategy: to
strengthen existing arrangements; to expand the membership of multilateral
regimes directed against proliferation; and to pursue new initiatives --
such as the Chemical Weapons Convention and the initiative the President
launched in May for the Middle East.
This latter effort reflects all the elements of our non- proliferation
strategy. It includes promising new approaches, such as a proposed set of
guidelines for responsible conventional weapons transfers to the region
and a proposal to freeze acquisition, production and testing of
surface-to-surface missiles. It also seeks to expand the membership of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention, and to
strengthen the application of these and other agreements where they are
already in force.
In other areas, we have already tightened export controls, streamlining
export-licensing procedures while taking full account of security needs.
New standards will ensure that the export of supercomputers will be
subject to stringent safeguards against misuse. Criminal penalties and
other sanctions against those who contribute to proliferation will be
To thwart the export of chemical and biological weapon- related
materials and technology, we have expanded our own controls over precursor
chemicals and proposed stringent international controls, recognizing that
only multilateral measures will be truly effective in a competitive global
marketplace. This multilateral approach bore fruit in the twenty-nation
Australia Group of major chemical suppliers, which agreed in May to
control common lists of chemical weapon precursors and equipment usable in
chemical weapons manufacture. The best non-proliferation measure, of
course, would be a completed Chemical Weapons Convention.
Our efforts to stem the proliferation of threatening missiles center on
the multinational Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), strengthened
last year by the inclusion of several new members. Since missile
proliferation efforts will surely persist, we and our MTCR partners must
improve controls, broaden membership further and reinforce the emerging
international consensus against the spread of missile technology.
In the nuclear sphere, last year's review conference of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty produced a large measure of consensus that the
NPT remains essential to global stability, although intransigence by a few
delegations blocked unanimous agreement to a final conference declaration.
The United States remains steadfast in support of the NPT and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which provides technical
assistance for civilian uses of nuclear energy while safeguarding
materials essential for the development of nuclear weapons. Although
trouble spots remain, progress has been made. Iraqi nuclear efforts have
been set back substantially, while the UN Special Commission implementing
Security Council Resolution 687 seeks dismantlement of all nuclear
weapon-related activities in Iraq. Argentina and Brazil have agreed to
accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities and to take steps
toward bringing into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which creates a Latin
American nuclear-weapons- free zone. Agreement by India and Pakistan to
ban attacks on each other's nuclear facilities also helped ease the tense
nuclear rivalry in that part of the world.
The proliferation of advanced weapons poses an ominous challenge to
global peace and stability. To meet it, we will work with our allies to
address the causes of strife while curbing exports to builders of weapons
of mass destruction.
The unprecedented scope and pace of change in today's world -- and the
increasing number of actors now able to threaten global peace -- highlight
the need for reliable information and a sophisticated understanding of
events and trends. The global reach of American intelligence capabilities
is a unique national asset, crucial not only to our own security, but also
to our leadership role in responding to international challenges.
The Soviet Union necessarily remains a major concern of U.S. policy.
While changes in the Soviet Union promise hope, the turbulence of change
itself demands that we monitor events and assess prospects for the future.
Our monitoring of Soviet military capabilities and the effective
verification of arms control treaties will remain the bedrock of any
effort to build confidence and a safer world.
In a new era there are also new tasks and new priorities. Regional
turmoil will place growing burdens on intelligence collection, processing
and analysis. At the same time, we must track the threats posed by
narcotics trafficking, terrorism and the proliferation of advanced
weapons. We must also be more fully aware of international financial,
trade and technology trends that could affect the security of the United
States, including its economic well-being.
Sweeping political and economic changes also make for a more
challenging counterintelligence environment. Warmer relations between the
United States and former adversaries will open new opportunities for the
intelligence services of those countries. Growing international economic
competition and potential regional instabilities vastly broaden the scope
of the potential intelligence threat. Our traditional openness, combined
with recent changes in immigration laws and the sheer volume of
information flow in the United States, affords great access to sensitive
information and facilities as well as to individuals who may be targets
for intelligence collection.
ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE
Foreign assistance is a vital instrument of American foreign policy.
Now as we look forward to expanded cooperation with our prosperous fellow
democracies, with a growing number of regional organizations and with a
revitalized United Nations -- we are revisiting the direction and
priorities of our foreign assistance program. We will focus our efforts
and resources on five major challenges:
-- Promoting and consolidating democratic values: Our programs will be
an increasingly valuable instrument for fostering political choice, human
rights and self- determination. From Central America to South Africa to
Eastern Europe, we have used our influence to advance these universal
-- Promoting market principles: U.S. assistance must encourage economic
reform and sustainable development. Multilaterally -- through institutions
like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade -- we foster policies that break down
statist barriers to enterprise and unleash the productive forces within
-- Promoting peace: The bonds of collective defense can be strengthened
through economic and security assistance. Such programs allow friendly
states to achieve the security and stability essential for political
freedom and economic growth. They are also an indispensable tool in
cementing our alliance relationships enhancing interoperability, promoting
needed access and reaping goodwill.
-- Protecting against transnational threats: International terrorism,
narcotics, AIDS and environmental degradation threaten all peaceful
nations. Our aid helps combat these dangers.
-- Meeting urgent human needs. We will respond quickly and
substantially to the suffering caused by natural or man- made disasters.
Managed wisely, our aid programs can play a key role in fostering a
world order that comports with our fundamental values. But we must ensure
that our resources are adequate, that our programs pursue well-defined
goals, and that we retain the flexibility to respond to change and
unforeseen requirements and opportunities. The changes we have recently
proposed to the Foreign Assistance Act will eliminate obsolete and
inconsistent provisions and set a solid foundation for cooperation with
the Congress on a program that can respond to fast-moving events in the
world as quickly as they occur. Such reform is urgently needed if our aid
program is to be relevant to today's necessities.
The international trade in drugs is a major threat to our national
security. No threat does more damage to our national values and
institutions, and the domestic violence generated by the trade in drugs is
all too familiar. Trafficking organizations undermine the sovereign
governments of our friends and weaken and distort national economies with
a vast, debilitating black market and large funding requirements for
enforcement, criminal justice, prevention and treatment systems. Demand
reduction at home and an aggressive attack on the international drug trade
are the main elements in our strategy. They must be pursued together.
During the 1990s, cocaine traffickers will likely try to develop new
markets in Europe -- particularly in light of the impending relaxation of
border controls between EC countries -- and in those nations of East Asia
experiencing rapid economic growth. We can also expect increasingly
energetic efforts to import cocaine and heroin into the United States,
including the use of longer-range aircraft entering U.S. airspace via
Canada and of drug-laden cargo containers transshipped to the United
States via Europe and the Pacific. Renewed assaults on the U.S. market by
increasingly sophisticated traffickers remind us of the need to also
attack the drug trade at the source -- its home country base of
Such an effort begins with bolstering the political commitment of drug
producer and transit countries to strengthen their laws, legal
institutions and programs to prosecute, punish, and -- where appropriate
-- extradite drug traffickers and money launderers. In the Andean region,
where most of the world's cocaine is cultivated and refined, we seek to
enhance the effectiveness of host- nation law enforcement and military
activities against powerful and well entrenched trafficking organizations,
and to increase public and leadership awareness of the drug threat. Our
trade, aid and investment programs aim to strengthen and diversify the
legitimate economies of the drug- producing Andean nations to enable them
to overcome the destabilizing effects of eliminating coca and its
derivatives, major sources of income. Our heroin strategy will foster
cooperation with other countries, to engage their resources to dismantle
their own cultivation and refining industries, and reduce demand for
drugs. We will solicit the assistance of others in influencing producers
to whom we have limited access.
IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
As a nation founded by immigrants and refugees, the United States has a
strong tradition of taking in those who flee persecution and seek a better
life. We open our doors annually to tens of thousands of refugees and
hundreds of thousands of immigrants, welcoming both for the diversity and
strength they bring the Nation. We also have a commitment to help the
uprooted who are in danger or in need, a commitment demonstrated in the
past several months by our role in the international effort to assist
Iraqi refugees and our reaching out to Africans and others.
In 1990 the United States welcomed refugees from all regions of the
world. As in the past several years, the majority came from the Soviet
Union and Asia. In Vietnam, we are dismayed by continued human rights
abuses. Hanoi is, however, allowing former political prisoners to
emigrate. The United States resettled 14,000 former political prisoners
and their family members from Vietnam in 1990 and the number will increase
this year. But we cannot take in everyone. We must look to other countries
to be more receptive to those in need. Nor can the United States
Government fund and provide for every refugee in this country. As in the
past, our private sector has an important role to play.
As noted earlier, economic hardship, political uncertainty and ethnic
strife may generate large numbers of refugees in Europe. Some will be true
refugees and others will be economic migrants, those who move to escape
economic misery. Though international responses must differ between these
two categories -- to be able to protect those who flee persecution and may
be in physical danger -- the world's nations must be ready to respond
quickly and humanely to both. For 16 million refugees worldwide, the
United States offers assistance through international programs and
recognizes the critical role of nongovernmental organizations in providing
care. Our budgeted refugee assistance levels have increased, and we will
do our fair share. We will also meet our responsibility to search for
diplomatic solutions to the problems that spawn refugee flows.
A period of turmoil and transition is often a period of dislocation. If
our diplomatic efforts and our aid programs prove inadequate, the volume
of refugees and migrants will be an index of our failure. The world
community will need to be prepared.
IV. RELATING MEANS TO ENDS: AN ECONOMIC AGENDA FOR THE 1990S
Events of the past year have reaffirmed the critical link between the
strength and flexibility of the U.S. economy and our ability to achieve
national objectives. Indeed, strong macroeconomic performance on the part
of the United States is not only an economic objective but a prerequisite
for maintaining a position of global political leadership.
Even as we now see a transformation of the global economy along lines
consistent with policies we nave pursued for many years, new challenges --
the crisis in the Gulf and its aftermath, the political and economic
transformation in Eastern Europe and potentially in the Soviet Union, the
resurgence of democracy and market economies in Central and South America
-- have placed new demands on our management of economic policy. We must
ensure that our domestic economy and our economic involvement abroad are
responsive to a changing economic landscape.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and actions taken by the international
coalition to resist Iraqi aggression, especially tested our economic
strength and our ability to help manage international economic forces.
Economies around the world were affected by the volatility of oil prices
and the disruption of economic ties to countries in the Gulf. Egypt,
Turkey and Jordan were particularly hurt. We must continue to work to
ensure the economic health of these countries as well as others that have
suffered markedly from this crisis. The United States will provide
leadership, but in close collaboration with major donors and creditors and
with international financial institutions, particularly the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
As always, a dynamic domestic economy plays a critical role in helping
us achieve national objectives in all spheres. Policies to control
inflation, reduce the Federal deficit, promote savings, improve the labor
force and encourage competitiveness and entrepreneurial initiative remain
critical to our overall well-being and security. As economies expand
worldwide, the economic strength of others will, of course, grow in
relative terms. This is not a threat to us, but rather a success of
Western policies. That said, Americans must realize that the economic
strength vital to our national interests comes from investing for the
future, thus putting a premium on domestic saving. Today's labor force and
management, and those of tomorrow, must also be committed to quality and
innovation. These are the fruits of hard work -- and a prerequisite for
continued global leadership.
We continue to pursue a strategy that expands and strengthens market
economies around the world. This will require international efforts to
open markets and expand trade; to strengthen cooperation among major
industrial countries and with international financial institutions; and to
apply imaginative solutions to the problems of developing countries.
MAINTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH
Clear signs are emerging that the U.S. economy is pulling out of its
brief recession but uncertainty remains over economic performance in much
of the rest of the world. Therefore, macroeconomic policies in all the
major countries must be designed to sustain global economic recovery with
price stability. Global growth is needed in order to create a favorable
economic and trade environment for reform and reconstruction in Eastern
Europe and the USSR, and ensure as well the success of the democratic,
market-oriented measures that have been adopted worldwide. The major
countries must continue to strengthen global coordination of economic
policies to achieve these aims.
While the U.S. trade deficit has continued to decline, trade imbalances
with Japan and many other countries remain substantial. Reducing these
imbalances remains a priority. I or the United States this requires a
sustained effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate budget deficits while
also encouraging private savings and investment in order to preserve U.S.
competitiveness. Countries with large trade surpluses bear a special
responsibility for maintaining adequate growth in domestic demand and
opening their markets further to imports.
The aggregate debt of developing countries was projected to reach $1.3
trillion in 1990, according to the World Bank. Inappropriate domestic
policies in debtor countries -- overvalued exchange rates, large budget
deficits, investment in inefficient public enterprises and restrictions on
trade and investment -- were major causes of this debt accumulation and
contributed to capital flight. External shocks, high international
interest rates and recession in the 1980s also hurt. Recently this burden
has been exacerbated by the economic dislocations and fluctuations in
energy prices resulting from the Gulf crisis.
In March 1989, the United States proposed a new international debt
strategy that advanced voluntary reduction of commercial bank debt and
debt service to help restore debtor financial health and pave the way for
new commercial bank lending. Implementation of a strong economic reform
program supported by the IMF and World Bank is a prerequisite. So far,
Mexico, Costa Rica, Nigeria, the Philippines, Venezuela, Morocco, Uruguay
and Chile have negotiated agreements under these proposals. Others are
undertaking reforms to obtain such support.
Creditor governments have also made substantial contributions to relief
through rescheduling of official bilateral debt and have recently offered
new treatment for the official debt of lower middle income countries, as
mandated by last year's Houston Economic Summit, and for Poland and Egypt.
The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative also promotes growth in Latin
America by emphasizing official debt reduction and investment reform.
Countries accept as natural that trade and investment should flow
freely within national boundaries or within special regional groupings in
order to improve economic and social welfare. Internationally, this
concept has met varying degrees of acceptance. Countries have protected
certain sectors for national security, economic, industrial or social
For the last 50 years, significant efforts have been undertaken,
primarily through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to
expand trade among all nations by opening markets and resolving trade
disputes. The latest and most ambitious effort has been the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, begun in 1986. The Uruguay Round is
distinguished from previous efforts by the intention of GATT members to
extend GATT rules to areas such as agriculture, services, investment, the
protection of intellectual property and textiles. At the Houston Economic
Summit in 1990, the United States, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy,
the United Kingdom, and the European Community committed to removing trade
barriers in these politically difficult areas. The wise action of Congress
in extending "fast track" procedures for trade agreements is evidence of
America's commitment to responsible leadership.
The promise of the Uruguay Round has yet to be fulfilled, however,
primarily because of strong differences over the scope and pace of efforts
to dismantle the enormous barriers to trade in agricultural goods. Given
the interdependence of modern economies, and the need to expand trading
opportunities for emerging democracies and other developing countries, it
is important that the Round be brought to a successful conclusion. This is
a test of the ability and willingness of all countries to rise to the
challenges of a new
world order and will require compromise on all sides. The United
States will do its part. A successful Round will not end bilateral trade
disputes but it will enable countries to resolve them in a multilateral
context and on the basis of internationally agreed rules.
The United States will continue its efforts to expand trade further. We
are working with Japan under the Structural Impediments Initiative to
lower trade barriers. As noted earlier, we are building on the successful
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement by undertaking discussions with Mexico
and Canada which we expect will lead to a trilateral free trade agreement
linking all three economies. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
and preferential trade programs for the Caribbean basin and the Andean
region will also foster trade liberalization.
The interrelationship of economic and military strength has never been
stronger. Both are affected by the way technology transfer is handled,
particularly with respect to export controls. Balances must be struck.
Loss of technological leadership can undermine military readiness and
strength. Not participating freely in worldwide markets constrains
economic growth. Recent changes to our strategic trade policies reflect a
new balance between these competing factors.
In cooperation with our Western partners in the Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), we have completely overhauled
export controls, reducing them to a core list of only the most
strategically significant goods and technologies. This action reflects the
emergence of democratic governments in Eastern Europe as well as a reduced
military threat to the United States and our allies from a dissolved
Warsaw Pact and a Soviet army that is withdrawing. The result has been a
two-thirds reduction in the licenses that industry is required to obtain
prior to exporting.
Treating the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe differently
from the Soviet Union, we and our COCOM partners have adopted a
wide-ranging special procedure for Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia that
ensures that controlled technology imports are used for purely civilian
applications. We look forward to the day when we can remove these
countries completely from the list of proscribed destinations. We have a
strong interest in promoting the growth of free markets in democratic
societies. At the same time we must be sure that the easing of COCOM
controls does not result in the proliferation of dangerous technologies to
other areas like the Middle East. For that reason, we have -- in close
cooperation with other supplier nations -- significantly improved controls
on technologies useful in developing nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons and the missiles to deliver them.
Secure, ample, diversified and clean supplies of energy are essential
to our national economic prosperity and security. For the foreseeable
future, oil will remain a vital element in our energy mix. For geological
and economic reasons, U.S. oil imports are likely to increase in coming
years. The rate of increase, however, could be reduced by improving the
efficiency with which oil is used in the economy and by substituting
Security of oil supplies is enhanced by a supportive foreign policy and
appropriate military capabilities. We will work to improve understanding
among key participants in the oil industry of the basic fundamentals of
the oil market. We will also maintain our capability to respond to
requests to protect vital oil facilities, on land or at sea, while working
to resolve the underlying political, social and economic tensions that
could threaten the free flow of oil.
The stability of the Gulf region, which contains two-thirds of the
world's known oil reserves, is of fundamental concern to us. Political and
military turbulence in the region has a direct impact on our economy,
largely through higher oil prices and potential supply disruptions.
Diversification of both productive and spare capacity is important to
providing a cushion to the oil market. Increased production, in an
environmentally sound manner, from other areas would also contribute to
the security of oil supplies.
Because energy markets particularly the oil market are global, our
energy security requires close cooperation among energy consumers. The
aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait demonstrates the need to improve
strategic stock levels within oil-consuming countries and the value of
international cooperation to help mitigate damage brought about by sudden,
serious disruptions of supply. The United States should develop creative
mechanisms to fill its Strategic Petroleum Reserve to the statutorily
required one billion barrels, consistent with sound budgetary practices
and avoiding an unnecessary burden on the oil market.
Our use of oil is the key source of our vulnerability to world oil
supply disruption. To reduce this vulnerability, we must work to both
reduce oil consumption and to use oil more efficiently. The efficient use
of energy in all sectors of our economy is of particular importance. We
must intensify The development of alternative sources of energy (nuclear,
natural gas, coal and renewables) and support aggressive research and
development of advanced energy technologies to provide the clean,
affordable, reliable energy supplies we will need in the mid-21 st
To meet pressing environmental concerns, we must limit the harmful
effects of energy production, transportation and use. The increased, safe
use of nuclear power, for example, can significantly reduce green-house
We must manage the Earth's natural resources in ways that protect the
potential for growth and opportunity for present and future generations.
The experience of the past half-century has taught that democratic
political institutions and free market economies enhance human well-
being. But even as we experience political and economic success, we cannot
ignore the costs that growth, unguided by wisdom, can impose on our
natural environment. A healthy economy and a healthy environment go
hand-in hand. Solutions must be found that protect our environment while
allowing for the economic development needed to improve the living
standards of a growing world population.
Global environmental concerns include such diverse but interrelated
issues as stratospheric ozone depletion, climate change, food security,
water supply, deforestation, biodiversity and treatment of wastes. A
common ingredient in each is that they respect no international
boundaries. The stress from these environmental challenges is already
contributing to political conflict. Recognizing a shared responsibility
for global stewardship is a necessary step for global progress. Our
partners will find the United States a ready and active participant in
The time has come to look beyond brief space encounters and to commit
to a future in which Americans and citizens of all nations live and work
in space. We have developed a plan to make this vision a reality and the
National Space Council, under Vice President Quayle, is charged with
bringing coherence, continuity and commitment to our efforts. We have made
solid progress in the five key elements of our space strategy:
-- Developing our space launch capability as a national resource: This
infrastructure will be to the 21st century what the great highway and dam
projects were to the 20th. Reliable space launchers will provide the
"highway" to space and the solar system in the next century.
-- Expanding human presence and activity beyond earth orbit and into
the Solar System: We are well underway with unmanned exploration of the
Solar System. Magellan, Viking and Voyager have been spectacular
successes, Galileo is on its way to Jupiter, Ulysses has launched on its
wide- ranging orbit of the sun and soon we will begin missions to Saturn
and the Asteroid Belt. The Space Exploration Initiative will build on the
successes and expertise developed in the Apollo, Skylab, Space Shuttle and
eventually the Space Station Freedom programs, ultimately establishing
permanent human settlements on the Moon and putting humans on Mars.
-- Obtaining scientific, technological and economic benefits and
improving the quality of life on earth: Communications satellites already
link people around the globe; their contribution to the free flow of
information and ideas played a part in the Revolution of '89. We also use
space systems to verify arms control treaties. But the potential of space
to improve life on earth has barely been tapped. A very promising
application is in the area of the onment -- monitoring and helping to
understand the process of ecological change, and holding significant
promise for new sources of energy, material and products.
-- Capitalizing on the unique environment of space to foster economic
well-being: Private investment in space will create jobs, boost the
economy and strengthen our scientific, engineering and industrial base.
New commercial markets will be created, and existing industries will
become stronger and more competitive in the world marketplace. The
recently approved commercial launch policy is a first step in this
-- Ensuring the freedom of space for exploration and development: There
are now some ten significant spacefaring nations, with others on the way.
Space will become in the future what oceans have always been -- highways
to discovery and commerce. But as with sea lanes, space lanes can be
closed and can even be used as springboards for attack. We must ensure the
freedom to use space for exploration and development, for ourselves and
all nations. Assured access to space requires a healthy military space
program. We must be able to monitor events in space, warn of threats and
intervene to protect important space assets. This protection may take the
form of passive measures to enhance the survivability of critical systems.
We must also have the option of active defense systems, including an
anti-satellite system, to stop an aggressor before he can use a space
system to threaten objects or people in or from space.
V. RELATING MEANS TO ENDS: A DEFENSE AGENDA FOR THE 1990S
As the war to liberate Kuwait clearly showed, the essential demands on
our military forces to deter conflict whenever possible but to prevail in
those that do arise -- are certain to endure. Nonetheless, the specific
challenges facing our military in the 1990s and beyond will be different
from those that have dominated our thinking for the past 40 years.
In a world less driven by an immediate, massive threat to Europe or the
danger of global war, the need to support a smaller but still crucial
forward presence and to deal with regional contingencies -- including
possibly a limited, conventional threat to Europe -- will shape how we
organize, equip, train, deploy and employ our active and reserve forces.
We must also have the ability to reconstitute forces, if necessary, to
counter any resurgent global threat.
As the war in the Gulf made clear, the easing of the Soviet threat does
not mean an end to all hazards. As we seek to build
a new world order
in the aftermath of the Cold War, we will likely discover that the enemy
we face is less an expansionist communism than it is instability itself.
And, in the face of multiple and varied threats to stability, we will
increasingly find our military strength a source of reassurance and a
foundation for security, regionally and globally.
In the face of competing fiscal demands and a changing but still
dangerous world, we have developed a new defense strategy that provides
the conceptual framework for our future forces. This new strategy will
guide our deliberate reductions to no more than the forces we need to
defend our interests and meet our global responsibilities. It will also
guide our restructuring so that our remaining forces are appropriate to
the challenges of a new era. The four fundamental demands of a new era are
already clear: to ensure strategic deterrence, to exercise forward
presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises and to retain the
national capacity to reconstitute forces should this ever be needed.
Deterrence will indeed be enhanced as a result of the START Treaty and
U.S. force modernization efforts can go forward with greater knowledge and
predictability about future Soviet forces. Nevertheless, even with the
Treaty, Soviet nuclear capabilities will remain substantial. Despite
economic and political difficulties, the Soviet Union continues its
modernization of strategic forces. Even in a new era, deterring nuclear
attack remains the number one defense priority of the United States.
Strategic Nuclear Forces
The modernization of our Triad of land-based missiles, strategic
bombers and submarine-launched missiles will be vital to the effectiveness
of our deterrent in the next century. We need to complete the Trident
submarine program with the eighteen boats and modern missiles necessary to
ensure a survivable force. The B-2 strategic bomber must be deployed so
that the flexibility traditionally provided by the bomber force will be
available in the future. The B-2 will also firmly plant our aerospace
industry in a new era of low-observable technology and the bomber itself
will have unique value across the spectrum of conflict. Finally, we must
continue the development of land-based, mobile ICBMs in order to keep our
deployment options open.
Our command, control and communications capabilities arc critical to
nuclear deterrence and to ensuring the survivability of our constitutional
government under all circumstances of attack. Our civil defense program is
still needed to deal with the consequences of an attack, while also
providing important capabilities to respond to natural and man-made
The safety, security, control and effectiveness of United States
nuclear weapon systems are also of paramount importance. We are
incorporating the most modern safety and control features into our
deterrent stockpile as rapidly as practicable and developing new safety
technologies for future weapons. Older weapons that lack the most modern
safety features are being replaced or retired.
Testing of nuclear weapons plays a key part in assuring the safety and
effectiveness of our deterrent forces. While we test only as much as is
required for national security purposes, testing is essential to ensure
the reliability and effectiveness of our weapons, to identify any safety
issues and to prove any corrective measures. A halt to nuclear testing
would not eliminate weapons or increase security, but it would erode
confidence in our deterrent and severely restrict our ability to make
improvements, especially in nuclear safety.
Just as our weapons must be safe, the facilities that produce them must
be safe, efficient, economical, and environmentally sound. Our current
facilities are being renovated and brought up to modern standards. At the
same time we are moving forward to consolidate and reconfigure the current
large and older complex, looking toward one that will be smaller, more
flexible and more efficient. Our production complex must be able to
respond to potential needs ranging from accelerated production to
accelerated retirement of weapons, depending on the security environment
in the years ahead.
We must also recognize that the deterrence issues of a new era are now
at hand. Despite the threat still posed by the existence of Soviet nuclear
weapons, the likelihood of their deliberate use by the Soviet state is
declining and the scenario which we frequently projected as the precursor
of their use -- massive war in Europe -- is less likely than at any other
time since World War II. These developments affect questions of nuclear
targeting, the alert status and operational procedures of our forces and
ultimately the type and number of weapons sufficient to ensure our safety
and that of our allies. We have already begun to make adjustments to our
nuclear forces and to the policies that guide them in recognition of the
disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and changes in the Soviet Union itself.
Beyond this, while we have traditionally focused on deterring a unitary,
rational actor applying a relatively knowable calculus of potential costs
and gains, our thinking must now encompass potential instabilities within
states as well as the potential threat from states or leaders who might
perceive they have little to lose in employing weapons of mass
Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces
Below the level of strategic forces, we have traditionally maintained
other nuclear forces for a variety of purposes. They have highlighted our
resolve and have helped to link conventional defense to the broader
strategic nuclear guarantee of the United States. This has helped remove
incentives that otherwise might have accelerated nuclear proliferation.
These systems have also served to deter an enemy's use of such weapons and
they have contributed to the deterrence of conventional attack. These
In Europe, we and our allies have always sought the lowest number and
most stable types of weapons needed to prevent war. Indeed, NATO has
unilaterally reduced thousands of nuclear weapons over the past decade, in
addition to the elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet weapons
as called for in the Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces. Changes
in Europe have now allowed us to forgo plans to modernize our LANCE
missiles and nuclear artillery shells and we will work to implement the
commitments of the London Declaration with respect to short-range nuclear
weapons currently deployed in Europe.
Even with the dramatic changes we see in Europe, however, non strategic
nuclear weapons remain integral to our strategy of deterrence. They make
NATO's resolve unmistakably clear and help prevent war by ensuring that
there are no circumstances in which a nuclear response to military action
might be discounted. In practical terms, this means greater reliance on
aircraft armed with modern weapons. As the principal means by which
Alliance members share nuclear risks and burdens, these aircraft and their
weapons must be based in Europe. Such a posture is not designed to
threaten any European state but to provide a secure deterrent in the face
of unforeseen circumstances.
Flexible response and deterrence through the threat of retaliation have
preserved the security of the United States and its allies for decades. In
the early 1980s, we began the Strategic Defense Initiative in the face of
an unconstrained Soviet ballistic-missile program and a significant Soviet
commitment to strategic defenses. SDI was intended to shift deterrence to
a safer, more stable basis as effective strategic defenses would diminish
the confidence of an adversary in his ability to execute a successful
Notwithstanding the continued modernization of Soviet offensive forces
and the pursuit of more effective strategic defenses, the positive changes
in our relationship with the Soviet Union and the fundamental changes in
Eastern Europe have markedly reduced the danger of a war in Europe that
could escalate to the strategic nuclear level. At the same time, the
threat posed by global ballistic-missile proliferation and by an
accidental or unauthorized launch resulting from political turmoil has
grown considerably. Thus, the United States, our forces, and our allies
and friends face a continued and even growing threat from ballistic
In response to these trends, we have redirected SDI to pursue a system
providing Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). With adequate
funding, it will be possible to begin to deploy systems that will better
protect our troops in the field from ballistic-missile attack by the mid-l
990s and that will protect the United States itself from such attacks by
the turn of the century. GPALS is designed to provide protection against a
ballistic missile launched from anywhere against a target anywhere in the
world. The system will be based on technologies which SDI has pioneered,
but would be both smaller and less expensive than the initial deployment
originally projected for SDI.
GPALS offers many potential advantages: the United States would be
protected against limited strikes by ballistic missiles; our
forward-deployed forces would be better defended against missile attacks;
and our allies, many of whom lie on the edge of troubled areas, could also
be better protected. The record of the PATRIOT against Iraqi SCUDs
highlights the great potential for defenses against ballistic missiles,
the critical role of missile defenses and the need to improve such
GPALS could also provide incentives against further proliferation of
ballistic missiles. If these missiles did not hold the potential to cause
certain and immediate damage, nations might be less likely to go to such
great lengths to acquire them. Access to U.S. assistance in defenses may
also provide an incentive for countries not to seek ballistic missiles or
weapons of mass destruction.
Maintaining a positive influence in distant regions requires that we
demonstrate our engagement. The forward presence of our military forces
often provides the essential glue in important alliance relationships and
signals that our commitments are backed by tangible actions. Our presence
can deter aggression, preserve regional balances, deflect arms races and
prevent the power vacuums that invite conflict. While our forward
deployments will be reduced in the future, the prudent forward basing of
forces and the propositioning of equipment reduce the burden of projecting
power from the continental United States. Indeed, certain regions -- like
Europe and East Asia -- represent such compelling interests to the United
States that they will demand the permanent deployment of some U.S. forces
for as long as they are needed and welcomed by our allies as part of a
common effort. But even in these regions, the site of our forward
deployments can be smaller as the threat diminishes and the defense
capabilities of our allies improve. In other regions our presence, while
important, can take less permanent forms.
Across the Atlantic: Europe and the Middle East
In Europe, Soviet reductions and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact
allow us to scale back our presence to a smaller, but still significant,
contribution to NATO's overall force levels. This presence will include
the equivalent of a robust army corps, with a corps headquarters,
associated corps units, and two ground force divisions supplemented by
several air wings, appropriate naval forces, and sufficient infrastructure
to support a return of additional forces. Such a force will preserve the
operational, not just symbolic, significance of our presence.
As called for in July at the London NATO Summit, we will work with our
allies to make our forces in Europe more flexible and mobile and more
fully integrated into multinational formations. NATO will establish a
multinational Rapid Reaction Corps to respond to crises and we expect
Alliance forces, including those of the United States, to be organized
into multinational corps that would function in peacetime, and not just be
contingent structures activated in a crisis. We will also exploit the
prospect of longer warning time in the event of a major crisis by backing
up our deployed forces with the ability to reinforce them with active and
reserve units from the United States, supported by the ability to
reconstitute larger forces over time should the need arise.
The aftermath of the crisis in the Gulf portends a need for some
measure of continuing presence in that region consistent with the desires
and needs of our friends. While the United States will not maintain a
permanent ground presence, we are committed to the region's security. We
will work with our friends to bolster their confidence and security
through such measures as exercises, propositioning of heavy equipment and
an enhanced naval presence. Our vital national interests depend on d
stable and secure Gulf.
Across the Pacific
Our enduring interests in East Asia and the Pacific also demand forces
sufficient to meet our responsibilities and to sustain our long-term
relationships with friends and allies. While East Asia has been
considerably less affected by the Revolution of '89 than Europe, the
growing strength and self-reliance of our friends in the region permit
some reduction in our presence.
A phased approach, responding to global and regional events, is the
soundest. We have announced our intent to adjust military personnel levels
in the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and Japan. This phase is
designed to thin out existing force structure and reshape our security
relationships. Before this phase ends in December 1992, over 15,000 U.S.
personnel will be withdrawn. Later phases will reduce and reorganize our
force structure further, as circumstances permit.
Korea represents the area of greatest potential danger, and reductions
there must be carefully measured against North Korean actions. However, we
have judged that the growing strength of our Korean allies permits us to
reduce our presence and begin to move toward a security partnership in
which the Korean armed forces assume the leading role. We are also
encouraged by the progress of the Japanese Government in rounding out its
own self-defense capabilities.
The Rest of the World
In other regions, as the need for our presence persists, we will
increasingly rely on periodic visits, training missions, access
agreements, propositioned equipment, exercises, combined planning and
security and humanitarian assistance to sustain the sense of common
interest and cooperation on which we would rely in deploying and employing
our military forces. As the Gulf crisis clearly showed, our strategy is
increasingly dependent on the support of regional friends and allies. In
fact -- during crises -- the cooperation and support of those local states
most directly threatened will be critical factors in determining our own
course of action.
Despite our best efforts to deter conflict, we must be prepared for our
interests to be challenged with force, often with little or no warning.
The Gulf crisis was ample evidence that such challenges will not always be
small or easily resolved. Because regional crises are the predominant
military threat we will face in the future, their demands -- along with
our forward presence requirements -- will be the primary determinant of
the size and structure of our future forces.
The regional contingencies we could face are many and varied. We must
be prepared for differences in terrain, climate and the nature of
threatening forces, as well as for differing levels of support from host
nations or others. We must also be able to respond quickly and effectively
to adversaries who may possess cruise missiles, modern air defenses,
chemical weapons, ballistic missiles and even large armor formations.
Although our forward deployed forces speed our ability to respond to
threats in areas like the Pacific or Europe, there are other regions where
threats, while likely to be less formidable, may prove no less urgent.
In this new era, therefore, the ability to project our power will
underpin our strategy more than ever. We must be able to deploy
substantial forces and sustain them in parts of the world where
propositioning of equipment will not always be feasible, where adequate
bases may not be available (at least before a crisis) and where there is a
less developed industrial base and infrastructure to support our forces
once they have arrived. Our strategy demands we be able to move men and
materiel to the scene of a crisis at a pace and in numbers sufficient to
field an overwhelming force. The 100-hour success of our ground forces in
the war to liberate Kuwait was stunning, but we should not allow it to
obscure the fact that we required six months to deploy these forces. As
our overall force levels draw down and our forward-deployed forces shrink,
we must sustain and expand our investment in airlift, sealift and where
possible -- propositioning. We must also ensure unimpeded transit of the
air and sea lanes and access to space through maritime and aerospace
superiority. our security assistance must, among other things, enhance the
ability of other nations to facilitate our deployments. And, over the
longer term, we must challenge our technology to develop forces that are
lethal but more readily deployable and more easily sustained than today's.
Readiness and Our Guard and Reserve Forces
For almost two decades, our Total Force Policy has placed a substantial
portion of our military manpower in high- quality, well-trained,
well-equipped and early-mobilizing Guard and Reserve units. Compared to
maintaining such a force in the active component, this was a
cost-effective strategy, a prudent response to an international security
environment where the predominant threat was major conflict in Europe or
global war with the Soviets, with warning of such a conflict measured in
weeks or even days.
That environment has been transformed. Today we must reshape our Guard
and Reserve forces so that they can continue their important contributions
in new circumstances. While we still face the possibility of sudden
conflict in many of the regional contingencies that could concern us,
these threats -- despite their danger -- will be on a smaller scale than
the threat formerly posed by the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies.
This will allow a smaller force overall, but those units oriented towards
short-warning, regional contingencies must be kept at high readiness.
Over time we will move to a Total Force that permits us to respond
initially to any regional contingency with units -- combat and support --
drawn wholly from the active component, except for a limited number of
support and mobility assets. Since many support functions can be more
economically maintained in the reserve component, we will still rely on
reserve support units in any extended confrontation. The primary focus of
reserve combat units will be to supplement active units in any especially
large or protracted deployment. To hedge against a future need for
expanded forces to deal with a renewed global confrontation, which --
though possible -- is less likely and clearly less immediate than
previously calculated, some reserve combat units will be retained in cadre
This approach will allow us to maintain a Total Force appropriate for
the strategic and fiscal demands of a new era: a smaller, more
self-contained and very ready active force able to respond quickly to
emerging threats; and a reduced but still essential reserve component with
emphasis on supporting and sustaining active combat forces, and -- in
particularly large or prolonged regional contingencies - - providing
latent combat capability that can be made ready when needed.
Even as we restructure for a new era, we will continue to place a
premium on the quality of our military personnel, the backbone of any
effective fighting force. True military power is measured by the
professional skills and dedication of our young men and women. In six
weeks and 1()0 decisive hours, today's military proved it is the most
skilled and effective fighting force this Nation has ever possessed. As we
make the adjustments appropriate to a new environment, we will preserve
this precious resource.
Beyond the crisis response capabilities provided by active and reserve
forces, we must have the ability to generate wholly new forces should the
need arise. Although we are hopeful for the future, history teaches us
caution. The 20th century has seen rapid shifts in the geopolitical
climate, and technology has repeatedly transformed the battlefield. The
ability to reconstitute is what allows us safely and selectively to scale
back and restructure our forces in-being.
This difficult task will require us to invest in hedging options whose
future dividends may not always be measurable now. It will require careful
attention to the vital elements of our military potential: the industrial
base, science and technology, and manpower. These elements were easily
accommodated in an era when we had to maintain large standing forces, when
we routinely invested heavily in defense R&D and when new items of
equipment were broadly and extensively produced. We will now have to work
much more deliberately to preserve them.
The standard by which we should measure our efforts is the response
time that our warning processes would provide us of a return to previous
levels of confrontation in Europe or in the world at large. We and our
allies must be able to reconstitute a credible defense faster than any
potential opponent can generate an overwhelming offense.
Reconstitution obviously includes manpower. Relatively large numbers of
personnel, trained in basic military skills, can be raised in one to two
years. But skilled, seasoned leaders -- high-quality senior NCOs and
officers - - require many years to develop and we must preserve this
critical nucleus to lead an expanding military force. This must be
reflected in how we man active, reserve and cadre units over the long
Another challenge will be to maintain our edge in defense technology,
even as we reduce our forces. Technology has historically been a
comparative advantage for American forces, and we have often relied on it
to overcome numerical disparities and to reduce the risk to American
Our technological edge in key areas of warfare will be even more
important at lower levels of forces and funding, and in the complex
political and military environment in which our forces will operate. But
maintaining this margin will become increasingly difficult as access to
advanced weaponry spreads and as our defense industry shrinks. Even in
regional contingencies it will not be uncommon for our forces to face
high-technology weapons in the hands of adversaries. This spread of
advanced systems will surely erode the deterrent value of our own -- and
our competitive edge in warfare -- unless we act decisively to maintain
We will, of course, have to decide which technologies we want to
advance and how we will pursue them. Our focus should be on promising,
high-leverage areas, especially those that play to our comparative
advantages and exploit the weaknesses of potential adversaries, whoever
and wherever they may be. Stealth, space-based systems, sensors, precision
weapons, advanced training technologies all these proved themselves in the
Gulf, yet when these programs (and others) were begun, no one foresaw
their use against Iraq. Our investment strategies must hedge against the
unknown, giving future Presidents the flexibility that such capabilities
We must be able to move promising research through development to rapid
fielding when changes in the international environment so require. The
"generation leaps" in technology and fielded systems that some have
suggested may not be possible. We will have to build some systems, as the
early production effort is a vital component of technology development.
Production, even in limited numbers, will also facilitate the
development of innovative doctrine and organizational structures to make
full use of the new technologies we field. In an era of tight fiscal
constraints, our development efforts must also strive to make our weapons
less expensive as well as more effective.
In the competition for scarce resources, emphasis on technology
development -- to pursue those new capabilities that may be most decisive
in the longer term -- may mean accepting some continued risk in the near
term. But accepting such risk may well be prudent in a period of reduced
The Industrial Base
Providing and sustaining modern equipment to support a rapid expansion
of the armed forces is an equally difficult proposition. We will need a
production base to produce new systems and a maintenance and repair base
to support them. These requirements pose unique problems, as reduced
defense budgets are shrinking the defense industrial sector overall. As we
make procurement and investment decisions, we will have to place a value
on the assured supply and timely delivery of defense materials in time of
In the near term, some of these problems can be ameliorated by
retaining and storing equipment from units being deactivated. Over the
longer term, however, as stored equipment becomes obsolete, the issue
becomes our capability to expand production or use alternative sources of
supply. We will need the capacity for industrial surge, accelerating
orders that are already in the pipeline. We will also have to plan for
production from new or alternative industrial capacity. It may also be
possible to reduce unneeded military specifications to make greater use of
items that can be created by the commercial production base. Above all, we
must continue to involve the creative resources of our national economy
and ensure that corporations continue to have incentives to engage in
innovative defense work.
A SMALLER AND RESTRUCTURED FORCE
Our future military will be smaller. Assuming there are no unforeseen,
worrisome trends in the security environment, by mid-decade our force can
be some 25 percent smaller than the force we maintained in the last days
of the Cold War. The changes we have seen in the overall international
environment have made this smaller force possible, and the increasing
demands on our resources to preserve the other elements of our national
strength have made it necessary.
Minimum Essential Military Forces The Base Force
Yet these planned reductions will cut our forces to a minimally
acceptable level -- to a Base Force below which further reductions would
not be prudent. These minimum forces represent our national security
insurance policy and consist of four basic force packages: Strategic
Forces, Atlantic Forces, Pacific Forces and Contingency Forces.
Our Strategic Forces must continue to meet the enduring demands of
nuclear deterrence and defense. The conventional force packages provide
forces for forward presence as well as the ability to respond to crises.
Our Atlantic Forces will be postured and trained for the heavy threats
characteristic of Europe and Southwest Asia and must be modern and lethal
enough to deal with these threats. Pacific Forces will be structured for
an essentially maritime theater, placing a premium on naval capabilities,
backed by the essential air and ground forces for enduring deterrence and
immediate crisis response. U.S.-based reinforcements will be lighter than
those we envisage for the Atlantic, as befits the potential contingencies
in the Pacific. Contingency Forces will include the Army's light and
airborne units, Marine expeditionary brigades, special operations forces
and selected air and naval assets. They will be largely based in the
United States and -- since they must be able to respond to spontaneous and
unpredictable crises -- they will largely be in the active component. At
times, the quick deployment of such a force in itself may be enough to
head off confrontation. At other times, we may need actually to employ
this force to deal with insurgencies, conduct anti-drug or anti-terrorist
operations, evacuate non-combatants or as we did in Desert Shield -- be
the first into action while heavier forces are alerted and moved.
The reductions projected by the mid-1990s are dramatic. It will be
important to manage their pace rationally and responsibly. We must
accommodate the actions taken in support of Desert Storm and Desert Shield
and we must be attentive to the professional skills of the armed forces
that have been built up over the past decade -- and which, as the war made
clear, remain vital to our national security. But now that the war has
been won, and as long as no unanticipated ominous trends emerge, we will
get back on the spending path agreed to before hostilities began. Highly
effective military forces can be supported within the levels agreed to by
Congress in the 1990 Budget Agreement if we can end unneeded programs,
consolidate bases, streamline procedures and adjust overall manpower
levels without arbitrary restrictions.
VI. TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY
The 20th century has taught us that security is indivisible. The
safety, freedom and well-being of one people cannot be separated from the
safety, freedom and well-being of all. Recently, the Gulf crisis
strengthened this sense of international community. Many of the underlying
forces now at work in the world are tending to draw that global community
even closer together. Technology, especially the explosion of
communication and information, has accelerated the pace of human contact.
The growing acceptance of the democratic ideal -- evidenced in the erosion
of totalitarianism and the expansion of basic human freedoms -- has also
brought the world closer together. The expansion of commerce and the
growing acceptance of market principles have accelerated the movement
toward interdependence and the integration of economies. Even the threats
posed by the proliferation of weapons of enormous destructiveness have
begun to draw the community of nations together in common concern.
As we move toward the 21st century, this interdependence of peoples
will grow and will continue to demand responsible American leadership.
Guided by the values that have inspired and nurtured our democracy at
home, we will work for a new world in which peace, security and
cooperation finally replace the confrontation of the Cold War, and
overcome the kind of threat represented by Iraq's aggression.
Developments in the Soviet Union and elsewhere have set in motion a
change in the strategic landscape as dramatic as that which the Nation
experienced when Soviet policy first forced the Cold War upon us. The
great threat to global peace has ebbed and we now see a Soviet state and
society struggling to overcome severe internal crisis. Notwithstanding the
uncertainties about the future course of the Soviet Union, that state's
willingness -- indeed, in many ways, its ability -- to project power
beyond its borders has been dramatically reduced for the foreseeable
future. Our strategy for this new era recognizes the opportunities and
challenges before us, and includes among its principles:
-- reinforcing the moral ties that hold our alliances together, even as
perceptions of a common security threat change;
-- encouraging the constructive evolution of the Soviet Union,
recognizing the limits of our influence and the continuing power of Soviet
-- supporting the independence and vitality of the new Eastern European
democracies even as we deal with the uncertainties of the Soviet future;
-- championing the principles of political and economic freedom as the
surest guarantors of human progress and happiness, as well as global
-- working with others in the global community to resolve regional
disputes and stem the proliferation of advanced weapons;
-- cooperating with the Soviet Union and others in achieving arms
control agreements that promote security and stability;
-- reducing our defense burden as appropriate, while restructuring our
forces for new challenges;
-- tending more carefully to our own economic competitiveness as the
foundation of our long-term strength; and
-- addressing the new global agenda of refugee flows, drug abuse and
We are a rich and powerful nation, and the elements of our power will
remain formidable. But our wealth and our strength are not without limits.
We must balance our commitments with our means and, above all, we must
wisely choose now which elements of our strength will best serve our needs
in the future. This is the challenge of strategy.
In this country we make such choices for peace just as we make the
awful choices of war -- as a democracy. When President and Congress work
together to build an effective security posture and policy -- was was done
in the 1980s -- we are successful. In the Gulf, our armed forces benefited
from the legacy of investment decisions, technological innovations, and
strategic planning that came in the decade before. Today's planning
decisions will determine whether we are well or ill prepared for the
contingencies that will confront us in the future.
This is a heavy responsibility, shared between the President and
Congress. We owe our servicemen and women not only the best equipment, but
also a coherent strategy and posture geared to new realities. This
coherence can only< come from a partnership between the Branches. Divided,
we will invite disasters. United, we can overcome any challenge.
In the Gulf, the dictator guessed wrong when he doubted America's unity
and will. The extraordinary unity we showed as a Nation in the Gulf
assured that we would prevail. It also sent the message loud and clear
that America is prepared for the challenges of the future, committed and
engaged in the world, as a reliable ally, friend and leader. (END TEXT)